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with Recommendations 
Steven E. Hendrix* 
INTRODUCTION 
In Latin America, the national civil codes are the traditional 
documents governing property ownership.! These codes are mod-
eled after the French and Italian civil codes.2 As such, they recognize 
standard property rights, including the right to buy, sell, trade, 
mortgage, and inherit property.3 Latin American agrarian reforms, 
however, have changed much of the conventional property law in 
rural areas.4 Thus, the agrarian reforms must be considered when 
analyzing tenure rights and related policy issues. 
* Steven E. Hendrix is the Land Tenure, Legal, and Policy Advisor to the LAC TECH and 
ACCESS II Projects from the Land Tenure Center of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, 
and holds law degrees in Bolivia (Universidad Mayor de San Andres) and the U.S. (University 
of Wisconsin). He is also an Honorary Fellow of the Institute for Legal Studies, University of 
Wisconsin Law School. 
The author acknowledges with gratitude the comments and suggestions of James Riordan 
(Chemonics International, LAC TECH Project, Washington, DC), Attorney Susan Bass (En-
vironmental Law Institute, Global Climate Change Project/Mexico, Washington, DC), Steven 
Smith (Land Tenure Center, ACCESS II Project, Madison, WI), Douglas Southgate (IDEA, 
Quito, Ecuador), Carlos Camacho (IDEA, Quito, Ecuador), Attorney Rolando Eyzaguirre 
(Instituto Libertad y Democracia, Lima, Peru), Attorney Julio Rendon Cano (Tegucigalpa, 
Honduras), Attorney Mireya Molina (Managua, Nicaragua), David Gibson (US Department 
of Agriculture, LAC TECH Project), and Attorney Laureano del Castillo (Servicios Educativos 
Rurales, Lima, Peru). All views, interpretations, recommendations, and conclusions expressed 
in this publication are those of the author and not necessarily those of the supporting or 
cooperating organizations, or the publisher. 
1 See, e.g., C6DIGO CIVIL [C. CIV.] arts. 599-929 (Hond.); C6DIGO CIVIL [C. CIV.] arts. 
464-ll23 (Guat.); C6DIGO CIVIL [c. CIV.] arts. 74-290 (Bol.); C6DIGO CIVIL [C. CIV.] arts. 
602-1014 (Ecuador); C6DIGO CIVIL [c. CIV.] arts. 881-ll31 (Peru); C6DIGO CIVIL [C. CIV.] 
arts. 560-951 (El Sal.); C6DIGO CIVIL [C. CIV.] arts. 525-ll32 (Venez.). 
2 The Andres Bello Code, first adopted in Chile and then adopted in most of Latin America, 
was modeled after the French Civil Code, with German and Italian influences. ARTURO 
VALENCIA ZEA, DERECHO CIVIL 29-40 (1981). The Nicaraguan Civil Code was taken from 
France. Steven E. Hendrix, The Crisis of Land Law and Policy in Nicaragua, 29 COMPo JUR. 
REv. 3, 4 (1992). 
3 See generally supra note 1. 
4 See, e.g., Hendrix, supra note 2, at 4-5. 
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In most Latin American agrarian reforms, governments created 
restrictions on rural land ownership.5 Often this took the form of 
restricting the size of the property and the ability to mortgage, 
inherit, sell, and rent as well as mandating land use such as agricul-
ture.6 Governments took these measures to prevent a reconsolida-
tion of landholdings and a return of latifundios, or large estates.7 
Latin American agrarian reform legislation is preoccupied with 
latifundios. Currently, however, there is a great international move-
ment toward individualization of ownership.s In the developing world, 
5 See, e.g., CONSTITUCION DE LA REpUBLICA DE VENEZUELA art. 99. 
6 See infra notes 44-66 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra note 59 and accompanying text. 
8 Changes toward privatization and agrarian reforms in other parts of the world are numer-
ous. Generally, land or agrarian reforms seek agricultural land reallocation. Historically, in 
many countries, land distribution was skewed, resulting in what many authors have described 
as feudal economic systems. As a consequence, peasants have struggled to make land distri-
bution more egalitarian. 
Latin America is not the only place where land reform programs have been implemented. 
One of the first agrarian reforms occurred under the Roman Empire which, as part of peace 
processes, gave grants of state-held land to victorious former combatants. See John Strasma, 
Coincidencias, Problemas y Oportunidades en la Implementacion de los Acuerdos de la Paz, 
en Cuanto a la Tierra, Presentation at the Agency for International Development in San 
Salvador, EI Salvador (Aug. 19, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Strasma Presentation). 
Many governments even retain control over private property in order to promote certain 
policy objectives. To put the discussion on Latin America into context, a brief examination 
of similar programs and legal trends elsewhere is useful: 
1. United States 
The traditional view is that the United States has "absolute" property rights. University of 
Minnesota Law School Professor Gerald Torres, Address at the Nicaraguan Property Regime 
after Sandinista Land Reform Conference in Leon, Nicaragua (Aug. 18, 1992). The United 
States, however, has had numerous land reforms or reallocation schemes. 
Until 1976, for example, the Homestead Act, not unlike Latin American colonization 
programs, provided land to colonists who after a specified number of years became fee-simple 
owners of the land. See Homestead Act of 1862, 43 U.S.C. § 161 (repealed 1976); see also 
GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & CHARLES F. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES 
LAw 69-71 (1981); PETER DORNER, LATIN AMERICAN LAND REFORMS IN THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE 3 (1992). 
In Puerto Rico, the legislature gave squatters on sugar plantations certain property rights. 
The federal courts subsequently upheld this grant. See People of Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar 
Assoc., 156 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 772 (1946). 
In 1984, because most property was owned by only a few families, the U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld a Hawaii statute allowing renters to organize into neighborhoods and to demand the 
sale of property to themselves. See Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
Similarly, the District of Columbia's urban renewal program, which used eminent domain 
power for the community's general welfare, was also upheld. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 
26 (1954). 
In addition, private property can be subjected to limitations pursuant to social policy 
objectives. See, e.g., Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
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2. Japan, Taiwan and South Korea 
Mter World War II, the United States was in a strong position to influence governments in 
Japan, Taiwan and South Korea to implement land reform programs. Cooperating with 
existing traditional farmer organizations, these governments focused their efforts on irrigated 
rice lands. The reforms broke the link between tenants and landlords by abolishing rent 
collection and control systems. See DORNER, supra, at 6-7. These successful reforms resulted 
in freehold interests by the possessors of the land and contributed to a subsequent boom in 
agriculture in these markets. 
3. Vietnam 
Recently, Vietnam has been liberalizing its agriculture policy and promoting commerciali-
zation. Small farmer producer cooperatives now have state backing. See Strasma Presentation, 
supra. 
4. The People's Republic of China 
In 1978, China began a process intended to end its system of agricultural communes. Article 
10 of the 1982 Constitution established that land in the rural and suburban areas is owned 
by collectives, except for those portions which belong to the state. Article 12 provides that 
land held by collectives can be operated under contract by either collectives or individuals. 
These contracts can run from thirty to fifty years, and are inheritable. See generally JOHN W. 
BRUCE & PAULA HERRELL, LAND REFORM IN THE PEOPLE'S REpUBLIC OF CHINA 1978-1988 
(1989). While the land itself may not be sold and remains property of the state and of the 
rural collectives, an amendment to Article 10 of the Constitution-passed in April 1988-now 
allows land "use rights" to be transferred to workers. 
5. The Former Soviet Union 
In Russia, privatization of government-held properties is in progress. The 1917 Land to the 
Tiller Decree nationalized all land, and then allowed that land to be distributed to beneficiar-
ies in any tenure form, including individual holdings. Because of the worldwide depression 
starting in 1929, however, the Soviet Union needed to industrialize and, consequently, re-
quired access to a cheap food source. Collectivization was used to achieve greater economies 
of scale and promote greater party control over agriculture. See William C. Thiesenhusen, 
Restitution for Expropriated Property upon the Fall of Communist Regimes: Case Studies on 
Eastern Europe, Address at The Inter-American Bar Association Program in Washington, D.C. 
(Sept. 18, 1992); Csaba Csaki et ai., Land Reform and Restructuring of the Kolkhoz and the 
Sovkhoz in the USSR and Russia Oan. 14, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author); Katie Rasmussen, Land Reform in the Russian Federation (undated, unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author); Michael G. Kitay, Donor Efforts for Land Reform and 
Privatization in the NIS, (Aug. 27, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
Today, about 94% of all Russian rural land is still controlled by the state or collective farms. 
President Boris Yeltsin's program aims to both eliminate all centrally planned targets and 
initiate a land reform. According to the plan, state properties and collectives would be 
reorganized as joint stock companies and would either be divided into individual units or 
privatized. As of July 1, 1992, however, only 135,000 individual farms existed in Russia, about 
2-3% of total land area. 
Like Russia, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan are also moving slowly. Armenia and Georgia are, 
however, progressing quicker to conversion of tenure, perhaps because their systems were 
shifted to collective ownership more recently than Russia, the Ukraine, or Kazakhstan. 
6. Kenya 
In the most systematic tenure conversion in Mrica, the Kenyan government has recently 
enacted the "individualization" process, a reduction of community controls over land use and 
distribution which enhanced the rights of individual landholders. SeeJohn Bruce, The Variety 
of Reform: A Review of Recent Experience with Land Reform and the Reform of Land Tenure, 
with Particular Reference to the Mrican Experience 17-20 (Sept. 1989) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the Land Tenure Center Library, University of Wisconsin (Madison)) 
[hereinafter Bruce, Mrican Experience]. 
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this has translated into a shift away from paternalistic controls which 
have regulated property use and restricted property rights.9 Conse-
quently, governmental policy often tries to establish private land-
holding possibilities that eliminate restrictions and allow free trans-
ferability.lo Efforts to privatize and make agricultural land use more 
efficient have overtaken land reform, at least in the popular media 
and politics.u 
Latin America is very much caught up in this movement. Since 
1990, Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru each have radically 
changed their old legislation by eliminating at least some restrictions 
on agrarian reform properties. Further, with the possible exception 
of Cuba, Latin American and Caribbean countries are reevaluating 
their land law and past agrarian reforms and looking to these four 
experiences for guidance.12 
7. Mozambique 
Although land "use rights" still cannot be sold or mortgaged and land remains the property 
of the state, a new policy of state divestiture of farms has begun. As part of a broader national 
economic liberalization, land concession periods have been extended from 15 to 50 years and 
"use rights" are now both renewable and inheritable. Further changes in the law are being 
debated as well. See John Bruce et a!., A Research Proposal: Land Policy and Divestiture in 
Mozambique (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Bruce, 
Mozambique]. 
8. South Africa 
There is great debate today whether there should be a land reform in South Africa to 
redress the grievances of the black, dispossessed majority. See Strasma Presentation, supra. 
9 John Strasma, Los Problemas de la Tenencia de la Tierra en el Mundo de Hoy, Address 
at the Tenencia de la Tierra Seminar in Quito, Ecuador (Feb. 5, 1992) [hereinafter Strasma, 
Quito Address]. 
10 Interview with Johnny Guarenas Borges, Director General of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
in Venezuela (Dec. 12, 1991). 
II The liberal reforms introduced in virtually all South American countries after inde-
pendence in the 19th century converted communal ownership by indigenous populations to 
private ownership, which in many cases led to these communities being dispossessed. The 
customary tenure forms that exist today in the Andes and Meso-America are, in general, 
accommodations and modifications of some of the precolonial tenure structures. See Eric B. 
Shearer et a!., The Reform of Rural Land Markets in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Research, Theory, and Policy Implications 11 (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author); Roger Plant, Land Rights for Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Developing Countries 
2 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Thus, it is easy to understand why 
many indigenous groups are nervous about attempts once again to privatize landholdings. 
12 It should be noted that Guatemala's Ley de Hefarma Agraria (Decreto 900 of 1952) from 
the Arbenz government was reversed by a coup in 1954. See generally Guillermo Pedroni 
Donnett, La ProblematicaAgraria Guatemalteca (1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author). Nevertheless, Guatemala may still be interested in reviewing its property legislation 
with a view towards providing greater access to land for the historically disadvantaged through 
market mechanisms. 
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This Article will compare and critique the four cases of Mexico, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru, and provide recommendations for 
these and other countries concerning property ownership. Propos-
als currently are being considered in EcuadorI3 and Bolivia.14 This 
Article will present recommendations for changes in property law and 
will attempt to assist drafters of legislation in the promotion of broadly 
based, sustainable, environmentally-friendly economic growth. 15 
A. Original Latin American Agrarian Reform Policies and Legislation 
In general, ancient Rome imposed no limits on property owner-
ship.16 This model was followed in the Napoleonic Code, which 
grants property owners absolute rights of ownership in conformity 
with law,17 and was brought to Latin America. Latin American legal 
doctrine, however, often establishes relative, rather than absolute, 
rights to property. IS Latin American jurisprudence often views prop-
erty ownership as involving a social function. 19 
Latin American property law also carried forward Italian and 
German notions of relative rights in property involving a social 
function, born in the legislation following World War 1,20 For exam-
ple, the Venezuelan definition of "property," set forth in that coun-
13 See Monica Naves, Marco de Referencia Para Una Nueva Estructura Legal de Tenencia 
de Predios Rusticos, Address at the Tenure Issues Conference in Quito, Ecuador (Feb. 2, 1992) 
(transcript available from author); Monica Naves, Futuro de Comunas y Cooperativas, Address 
at the Tenure Issues Conference in Quito, Ecuador (Feb. 6, 1992) (transcript available from 
author). 
14 See generally Miguel Urioste F. de C., Segundo Borrador: Anteproyecto de Ley de Comunidades 
y de Nacionalidades in SEMINARIO: COMUNIDAD CAMPESINA Y LEGISLACI6N, (Honerable 
Camera de Diputados-Republica de Bolivia ed., 1990);Jose Luis Roca, Resumen de la Exposi-
cion, in 18 DEBATE AGRARIO: PROPUESTA DE LEY AGRARIA, (Instituto Latinoamericano de 
Investigaciones Sociales ed., 1992). 
15 It should also be noted that changes parallel to those in land are being proposed or 
enacted in water law in many parts of Latin America. Controls over water have often tended 
to be as or even more limiting than controls over land. Relaxation of restrictions in both land 
and water law could have major impacts on agriculture and the rural economies of many 
countries. 
16 JOSE LUIS AGUILAR GORRONDONA, COSAS, BIENES Y DERECHOS REALES 171 (1991); RAM6N 
VICENTE CASANOVA, DERECHO AGRARIO 39 (5th ed. 1990). 
17 CASANOVA, supra note 16, at 39. Interestingly, Spanish doctrinists Colin and Capitant 
assert that the absolute nature of property under the French Civil Code is antisocial and 
antijuridical. Id. at 39 (citing COLIN & CAPITANT, CURSO ELEMENTAL DE DERECHO CIVIL 543 
(1942». 
18 For a discussion of the Venezuelan property rights doctrine, see id. at 39. 
19 See CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REpUBLICA DE VENEZUELA art. 99. 
20 CASANOVA, supra note 16, at 40-41. 
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try's Civil Code, states, "[it is a] right to use, enjoy and dispose of 
an item in an exclusive manner in accordance with the restrictions 
and obligations imposed by law. "21 This adaptation drops the term 
"absolute" contained in the French Civil Code's definition of prop-
erty.22 
1. Definitions and Terms 
In general, Latin American property is legally divided into real 
property and personal property.23 Property belonging to countries, 
states, or municipalities can either be characterized as public or 
private property.24 Public property, as defined by civil codes, usually 
includes roads, lakes, rivers, coasts, ports, and property held for 
national defense purposes.25 Public property usually cannot be sold 
or given away, and cannot be subject to a mortgage or lien.26 
In contrast, private property belonging to the country, states, or 
municipalities includes anything other than public property.27 These 
properties usually can be mortgaged, given away, or sold, provided 
that the proper formalities are followed. 28 
Public land is either ejidd!9 or baldia. Generally, ejidalland is land 
that belonged to the municipalities at the time of colonization,3o 
although it also consists of other municipal lands subsequently ac-
quired. This land cannot be sold or mortgaged.31 Baldia land basi-
cally consists of land belonging to the government which is not ejidal 
land and which has no other legal owner.32 The government may 
21 C. CIV. art. 545 (Venez.) (translation by author). Article 99 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Venezuela guarantees the right of property. 
22 See AGUILAR, supra note 16, at 170-77. 
23C. CIY. arts. 2311-14 (Arg.); C. CIY. art. 74 (Bol.); C. CIY. art. 603 (Ecuador); C. CIY. art. 
600 (Hond.); C. CIV. arts. 885-86 (Peru). 
24 C. CIY. art. 539 (Venez.). 
25 Id.; see also AGUILAR, supra note 16, at 77. 
26 See C. CIY. art. 543 (Venez.); AGUILAR, supra note 16, at 81. 
27 See AGUILAR, supra note 16, at 83. 
28 Regarding Venezuela, see id. at 83-88. 
29 The history of ejidalland in Venezuela is discussed in Luis GONZALEZ VALE, ENSAYO SOBRE 
DERECHO AGRARIO Y REFORMA AGRARIA EN VENEZUELA 58-74 (1963). 
30 Ley de Tierras Baldias y Ejidos, art. 3 (1936) (Venez.). 
31 See CONSTITUCION DE LA REpUBLICA DE VENEZUELA art. 99. 
32 Ley de Tierras Baldias y Colonizaci6n, art. 1 R.O. 342 de 28-IX64 (1936) (Ecuador); Ley 
de Tierras Baldias y Ejidos (1936) (Venez.). 
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sell or assign this land.33 If, for example, the government assigns the 
land to a municipality, it becomes ejida land.34 
2. Social Function, Possession, and Land 
Latin America has been influenced by many countries in terms of 
social policy and ownership issues. The ancient Greeks and Romans, 
revolutions in Russia and China, and other more recent social conflicts 
indicate an interrelationship between land and social policy.35 
The agrarian reform laws were designed to address land owner-
ship questions and social policy.36 More specifically, these laws were 
conceived as a means of transforming the agrarian structure from 
large estates to small, producer-owned plots.37 The struggle against 
latiJundias is of such national importance that the struggle was ad-
dressed in some countries' constitutions.38 Furthermore, social pol-
icy dictated, as a means of promoting equality ofland ownership and 
elimination of peasant worker exploitation, that whomever worked 
33 Ley de Tierras Baldias y Colonizacion, art, 6 (1964) (Ecuador); CONSTITUCION DE LA 
REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA art. 136. 
34 See Ley de Tierras Baldias y Ejidos, art. 30 (1936) (Venez.). 
35 CASANOVA, supra note 16, at 41, 113-17. 
36 Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 1 G.O. 611 (1960) (Venez.). Regarding Argentina, Angel 
Ossorio defines the social function of property as "the right to use, enjoy and dispose of goods 
in accordance with its nature." (translation by author). This concept of property differs from 
that established in several codes, in which the owner can use and enjoy the property according 
to his wishes, even if he destroys or degrades the property. For a definition of "funcion social," 
see MANUEL OSSORIO, DICCIONARIO DE CIENCIAS JURIDICAS, POLlTICAS Y SOCIALES 330 
(1981). For a discussion of the "psychological liberation" of the peasant in the agrarian reform 
in Bolivia, see EDMUNDO FLORES, UN ANo DE REFORMA AGRARIA EN BOLIVIA (1956). 
37 Dwight Braley Heath argues that these laws virtually abolished feudalism. See DWIGHT 
BRALEY HEATH, LAND REFORM IN BOLIVIA (1959). As of that date, however, few other aspects 
of the reform's objectives had been achieved. See C. CIV. art. 213 (Bol.); Ley de Reforma 
Agraria, art. 1 G.O. 611 (Venez.); CASANOVA, supra note 16, at 42. 
38 See CONSTITUCION POLlTICA DEL ESTADO arts. 165-66 (Bol.) (stating that all land is 
originally owned by the state and that one obtains ownership of property through work); 
CHILE CONST. art. 19, 'l[ 24 (stating that the social function of property includes the require-
ments of the nation's general interests, security, public use, and health, and the conservation 
of the environmental patrimony); see also CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA art. 58 
(stating that the social function ofland includes an ecological mission); CONSTITUCION DE LA 
REpUBLICA DOMINICANA art. 13(a); CONSTITUCION DE LA REpUBLICA art. 48 (Ecuador); 
CONSTITUCION POLlTICA DE NICARAGUA art. 103; CONSTITUCIONES POLlTICAS DE HONDURAS 
art. 345; Nueva Legislacion Agraria, art. 27, 'l[ 15 (1991) (Mex.). For further pertinent 
commentary, see generally Joseph R. Thome, Agrarian Reform Legislation: Chile, in 3 LAND 
REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 79, 81 (Peter Dorner ed., 1971). For the importance of land in 
the popular debate in Mexico, see generally Juan Rulfo, Nos han dado La tierra, in EL LLANO 
EN LLAMAS 9-15 (Coleccion Popular, Fundo de Cultura Economica Mexico ed., 1982); MARI-
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the land should also own it.39 In fact, agrarian law generally was 
structured to protect farmers, rural workers, and campesinos.40 
"Social function" is a shorthand, catchall term which refers to the 
notion that land should be used to promote social and economic 
development,41 rather than simply be viewed as a market commodity. 
This approach to land policy is typical in Latin America. Social policy 
and concerns were behind the "land to the tiller" land reform 
programs in the 1960s.42 Implicit in this approach is a suspicion that 
market forces will act against the interest of the lower classes if left 
unchecked. As a result, Latin American governments have addressed 
social function concerns in their laws.43 
3. The Dotaci6n and Limitations on Rural Property Rights 
Latin American agrarian reform programs usually provide dotacio-
nes, or land grants, subject to certain conditions.44 These programs 
do not convey fee-simple titles. Rather, the programs generally pro-
ANO ANZUELA, Los DE ABAJO (1990). Article 32 of the Constitution of Uruguay recognizes 
property as an inviolable right, subject to laws which advance the general interest. URUGUAY 
CON ST. art. 32. 
39 Social policy in Brazil is focused on environmental issues. See Decree 433 of Jan. 24, 1992, 
D.O. 921027, 1992; Decree 432 of Jan. 27, 1992, D.O. 920127, 1992 (Brazil); CONSTITUCION 
DE LA REpUBLICA art. 51 (Ecuador); Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 24 D.O. 21-482 (1974) 
(Hond.), amended in part and repealed in part lry Ley para la Modernizacion y el Desarrollo 
del Sector Agricola, D.O. 31-92 (1992) (Hond.); see also Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 1, 
Decreto Ley No. 17716, Decreto Supremo No. 265-70-AG (1970) (Peru) ("The land consti-
tutes, for the man who works it, a basis for his economic stability, foundation for his well-being 
and a guarantee of his dignity and liberty.") (translation by author); CASANOVA, supra note 
16, at 48. 
40 CONSTITUCION DE LA REpUBLICA art. 51 (Ecuador). For Haiti, see Decree of July 14,1989, 
L.M. 890727,1989 (authorizing the Ministry of Economy and Public Finances to carry out a 
systematic survey of all arable land owned by the state for distribution to needy rural families). 
For Venezuela, see ALI JOSE VENTURINI, DERECHO AGRARIO VENEZOLANO 56-58 (1976). 
4\ For the Dominican Republic, see Decree 2960 of May 11, 1985, G.O. 850515 (1985) 
(discussing which lands can and should be seized under laws relating to quotas, untilled land, 
large rural estates, and recovery of state lands). Spain also recognized the concept of the 
"fun cion socia\." "Bonner Grunddesetz," an equivalent concept, appears in the German 
Constitution. See CONST. F.R.G. art. 14. The notion of social function is also found in Italy. 
See Codice Civil [C. c.l art. 832 (Italy); see also RAUL ROMERO SANDOVAL, DERECHOS REALES 
83-87 (2d ed. 1991). In Guatemala, where the 1952 Arbenz land reform was quickly reversed, 
the constitutional provision on property does not include the words "funcion socia\." See 
CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REpUBLICA DE GUATEMALA art 39. It does, however, state that 
property owners can use and enjoy their property in a way that promotes "el progreso 
individual y el desarrollo nacional en beneficio de todos los guatemaltecos." [d. 
42 See generally DORNER, supra note 8, at 11-12. 
43 CONSTITUCION DE LA REpUBLICA art. 48 (Ecuador). 
44 See infra notes 45-66 and accompanying text. 
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vide a "usufruct," or, more specifically, a determinable life estate with 
a restraint on alienation.45 The beneficiary has the right to use the 
property while he works the land. If the land is abandoned, or not 
used to promote social policy, it can revert to state control and 
ownership.46 The beneficiary usually cannot place a mortgage on the 
land because he or she is not the fee-simple ownerY Sometimes the 
land can also be passed to heirs in wills or through intestacy, assum-
ing that subsequent holders continue to use the land in conformity 
with the government's social objectives.48 For example, prior law in 
Peru required governmental authorization before the mortgage, 
transfer, or sale of agrarian reform property.49 
The dotaciones are distinct from other forms of landholdings con-
templated in the civil codes.50 First, dotaciones should not be con-
fused with usufructs. A usufruct is a civil code equivalent to a right 
to use and enjoy the property of anotherY While a usufruct can be 
45 The idea of a "use right" or lease is common throughout agrarian reforms, not only in 
Latin America, but also in Mrica. See Bruce, Mrican Experience, supra note 8, at 9. In Mrica, 
a leasehold system is commonly thought to be more consistent with indigenous tenure models 
which recognize tribal or other community interests in land. [d. The state is viewed as the 
successor to the tribe, exercising its land allocation prerogatives. [d. Where the state consists 
of a single tribe or ethnic group and the chief or king of the group is the head of state, the 
lease may simply be a new legal instrument for exercising traditional powers to allocate land. 
[d. The Latin American dotaci6n may also be compared to the English common law concept 
of a determinable life estate with a restraint on alienation, in which a beneficiary owns the 
property for life (and thus cannot pass the property on through a will or through intestacy), 
so long as he farms or uses the land, and may not sell or transfer the land. Cf General Property 
Law, art. 80 (1973) (Zaire) (stating that land is owned by the government, which in turn can 
grant concessions, even, for example, perpetual concessions-the right to enjoy the land 
indefinitely-as long as certain legal conditions are satisfied). See James C. Riddell et al., The 
National Land Law of Zaire and Indigenous Land Tenure in Central Bandundu, Zaire 13 
(Jan. 1987) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
46 See Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 48 R.O. 877-18-VII (1979) (Ecuador); Ley de Reforma 
Agraria, art. 41(a) D.O. 21-482 (1975) (Hond.), amended in part by and repealed in part by 
Ley para la Modernizaci6n y el Desarrollo del Sector Agricola, D.O. 31-92 (1992); see also 
Ley de Reforma Agraria, arts. 7, 8, 15, Decreto Ley No. 17716, Decreto Supremo No. 265-
70-AG (1970) (Peru). 
47Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 86(c), Decreto Ley No. 17716, Decreto Supremo No. 
265-70-AG (Peru); Agrarian Reform Law, art. 15 G.O. 611 (1960) (Venez.). 
48 Ley de ReformaAgraria, art. 73 G.O. 611 (1960) (Venez.). 
49 Ley de Reforma Agraria, arts. 86(a)-(c), Decreto Ley No. 17716, Decreto Supremo No. 
265-70-AG (1970) (Peru). 
50 CASANOVA, supra note 16, at 254-55. 
51 See C. CIV. arts. 796-842 (Ecuador); C. CIV. arts. 769-812 (El Sal.); C. CIV. arts. 745-89 
(Hond.); C. CIV. arts. 999-1005 (Peru). For a general discussion of the usufruct in Venezuela, 
see EMILIO CALVO BACA, MANUAL DE DERECHO CIVIL VENEZOLANO 177-82 (1984). For a 
historical perspective, see ANiBAL DOMINICI, 1 COMENTARIOS AL CODIGO CIVIL VENEZOLANO 
634-90 (Rea ed., 1962) [hereinafter DOMINICI 1]. 
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bought, sold, inherited, or transferred, a dotacion cannot. Further, 
the dotacion has only one owner and no one else can use the land; 
with a usufruct, one person owns the land while another has the 
right to use it. Second, the dotacion should be distinguished from 
the emphyteusis, which is basically a long-term lease with a requirement 
to improve the land, allowing the right to use and enjoy the land as 
if it were owned outright.52 Third, the dotacion is different from an 
antichresis, a loan in which the creditor is given access and permis-
sion to use the collateral, usually a house.53 Finally, the dotacion should 
be distinguished from a rental agreement and from sharecropping. 54 
Most civil code property regimes allow for limitations on rural 
property rights. These limitations include the usufruct, the right of 
habitation, and the right of housing.55 Servitudes are, likewise, con-
templated in most jurisdictions.56 
The agrarian reform laws often imposed additional restrictions on 
land ownership rights in accordance with the notion of land and 
social policy. Under agrarian reform law, the dotaciones generally 
cannot be sold, rented, or inherited without the express approval of 
the national agrarian instituteY At the very least, they are subject to 
regulation and contro1.58 The dotaciones were seen as a way to trans-
52 For a historical perspective of Venezuela, see ANiBAL DOMINICI, 4 COMENTARIOS AL 
CODIGO CIVIL VENEZOLANO 10-16 (Rea ed., 1962) [hereinafter DOMINICI 4]. 
53C. CIV. arts. 1091-96 (Peru). 
54 The concept of rental agreements is discussed in RAMON JOSE DUQUE CORREDOR, CON-
TRATOS AGRARIOS 56-60 (1986) [hereinafter DUQUE, CONTRATOS]. For a historical perspective 
of Venezuela, see DOMINICI 4, supra note 52, at 17-80. Both sharecropping and rental of 
agricultural land are illegal in Bolivia. See C. CIV. art. 214 (Bol.). 
55C. CIV. arts. 216-54 (Bol.); C. CIV. arts. 703-51 (Guat.); C. CIV. arts. 1026-29 (Peru); C. 
CIV. art. 582 (Venez.). 
56C. CIV. arts. 255-90 (Bol.); C. CIV. arts. 876-88 (Ecuador); C. CIV. arts. 822-33 (EI Sal.); 
C. CIV. arts. 752-59 (Guat.); C. CIV. arts. 799-867 (Hond.); C. CIV. arts. 1035-54 (Peru); C. 
CIV. art. 709 et seq. (Venez.). For a pertinent historical perspective, see DOMINICI 1, supra note 
51, at 713-812. 
57 See generally supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text. 
58 For example, small landholder and campesino land in Bolivia is indivisible and cannot be 
mortgaged. CONSTITUCION DE LA REpUBLICA DE BOLIVIA art. 196. Land which exceeds certain 
size limits, however, may be the subject of encumbrances and mortgages. See Ley de Reforma 
Agraria, arts. 15, 32-33 (Bol.); Resolution 2491 G.O. 910408 (1991) (Cuba); Colonization Law 
No. 1783, arts. 9-12 (1948) (Dom. Rep.). The Dominican Republic's Colonization Law 
specifies that land received cannot be rented or otherwise passed to others before final 
issuance of a permanent title. Colonization Law No. 1783, arts. 9-12 (1948) (Dom. Rep.). 
Under that law, eight years of occupation and use are required before consideration for 
permanent title in colonies along the border. Under the post-Trujillo Agrarian Reform Law 
of 1962 and subsequent amendments, however, the period of provisional title, either individ-
ual or collective, is undefined. See J. DAVID STANFIELD ET AL., EVOLVING PROPERTY RELATIONS 
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form the agrarian structure, and legislatures often imposed these 
restrictions to prevent a return to a latifundio system.59 
Although the agrarian reform laws often provide for a size limita-
tion, limits may also be set through administrative rule-making.60 
Thus, the laws try to prevent large land estates from being held by 
a single owner.61 In addition, laws may attempt to prevent parceliza-
tion of property (minifundios). 62 
Most agrarian reforms recognized that land alone would not bring 
the campesinos into the economy.63 Policy-makers, therefore, included 
rural credit.64 In order to provide such credit, the governments 
created agriculture credit institutes, funds, and banks. 
IN THE AGRARIAN REFORM OF THE DOMINICAN REpUBLIC 22-23 (1986); see also Ley del 
Regimen Especial de la Tierra y de los Derechos y Obligaciones de los Beneficiarios de la 
Reforma Agraria, art. 5 (1992) (EI Sal.); Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 127, Decreto Ley No. 
17716, Decreto Supremo No. 265-70-AG (1970) (Peru) (illegalizing rental of agrarian reform 
land). In the case of Venezuela, see RAMON JOSE DUQUE CORREDOR, DERECHO AGRARIO: 
INSTITUCIONES 213 (1985) [hereinafter DUQUE, INSTITUCIONES]; Ley de Reforma Agraria, 
arts. 15,74 G.O. 611 (1960) (Venez.); if. Portugal: Decree 63-89 of Feb. 9,1989 D.R. 890224 
(1989); Law 109-88 of Sept. 7, 1988 D.R. 880926 (1988); Decree 199-88 of May 31,1988 D.R. 
880531 (1988). 
59 For Venezuela, see CASANOVA, supra note 16, at 260. In Chile, the military government 
moved to reverse the agrarian reform. See Lovell S. Jarvis, The Unraveling of Chile's Agrarian 
Reform, in SEARCHING FOR AGRARIAN REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 240, 244 (William C. Thie-
sen heusen ed., 1989). For example, restrictions imposed on land transactions were gradually 
set aside to permit the subdivision and sale of all private properties. The rental or sale of 
reform-sector parcels was initially prohibited, but the government ignored the illegal sales 
that occurred. In 1979, free transaction in such parcels was legalized. See id. 
60 Yugoslavia imposes a maximum size limit of 10 hectares. CASANOVA, supra note 16, at 47. 
Cuba sets the limit at five caballerias. [d. See Interview with Ing. Manuel Cristobal Nuiiez, 
Program Director for Cadastres and Titling, Department of Agriculture, Office of Titling, in 
Lima, Peru Gune 28, 1991); Interview with Ing. Carlos Mendoza Mejia, Peruvian Department 
of Agriculture, Office of Titling, in Lima, Peru Gune 28,1991) [hereinafter Mejia Interview]. 
61 EI Salvador sets a limit on agricultural land at 245 hectares. CONSTITUCION DE LA 
REpUBLICA DE EL SALVADOR art. 105. Venezuela does not provide for size limitations in its 
agrarian reform legislation. Land lots can be of any size, provided these parcels meet the 
social policy criteria. See Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 19 G.O. 611 (1960) (Venez.). 
62 See Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 98 R.O. 877-98-VII (1979) (Ecuador); Ley de Reforma 
Agraria, art. 41(a) D.O. 21-482 (1975) (Hond.), amended in part by and repealed in part by 
Ley para la Modernizaci6n y el Desarrollo del Sector Agricola D.O. 31-92 (1992); Ley de 
Reforma Agraria, art. 1, Decreto Ley No. 17716, Decreto Supremo No. 265-70-AG (1970) 
(Peru). 
63 For the case of Venezuela, see SALVADOR DE LA PLAZA ET AL., REFORMA AGRARIA VENE-
ZOLANA: CONCEPCION, EVALUACION Y PERSPECTIVAS 56 (1968). 
64 See CONSTITUCION DE LA REpUBLICA DE COLOMBIA art. 64; Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 
126 D.O. 21-482 (1975) (Hond.), amended in part by and repealed in part by Ley para la 
Modernizaci6n y el Desarrollo del Sector Agricola D.O. 31-92 (1992). For a Venezuelan 
example discussing the role of agricultural credit as an element in the plan for economic 
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In addition, each dotaci6n often included technical assistance. 
Governments, through their agriculture ministries, often created an 
extensive system of agricultural extension.65 Further, each agricul-
tural center often provided additional extension and outreach serv-
ices.66 
4. Limitations on Ownership of the Subsoil 
Latin American law differentiates between the soil and the subsoil. 
Generally, the soil belongs to the owner, while the government owns 
the subsoil.67 Soil encompasses the depth necessary to work the land 
or to construct buildings. Mineral rights and mining are often gov-
erned by special law.68 Subsoil and the extraction of mineral sub-
stances are regulated by this legislation.69 In some cases, even trees 
cannot be cut without official permission.70 
Because property owners do not possess subsoil rights, they have 
little incentive to invest in the exploitation or preservation of these 
resources. In indigenous reserves, where the quality of the land itself 
may be marginal, lack of subsoil rights also denies the indigenous 
community access to a potentially important source of self-sustaining 
revenue. 
development, see BANCO AGRiCOLA y PECUARIO, EL CREDITO AGRicOLA EN LOS SISTEMAS DE 
RIEGO 1 (1971). 
65 See CONSTITUCION DE LA REpUBLICA DOMINICANA art. 13(a) (1966); Ley de Reforma 
Agraria, arts. 125-27 G.O. 611 (1960) (Venez.). 
66 See Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 80 G.O. 611 (1960) (Venez.). 
67 See, e.g., C6digo Mining [C. MINING] Laws 10273, 17319 (Arg.); SANDOVAL, supra note 
41, at 123-34; C6digo Mining [CO MINING] Laws 18248, 18097 (Chile); CONSTITUCION 
POLiTiCA DE COLOMBIA art. 360; C6digo Mining [C. MINING]; Decree 2655 (Colom.); C6digo 
Petroleum [C. PETROLEUM] Decree 1056 (Colom.); CONSTITUCION DE LA REpUBLICA DOMINI-
CANA art. 100 (Dom. Rep.); CONSTITUCION DE LA REP1JBLICA DE EL SALVADOR art. 103 (El 
Sal.); C6digo Mining [C. MINING] Laws 15242, 14, 181 (Uru.); see also Riddell, supra note 45, 
at 8; cf ZAIRE CONST. art. 10 (stating that "Zairian soil and subsoil belong to the State. The 
conditions for their concession shall be fixed by law. ") 
68 See, e.g., Law 1297 of Nov. 27, 1991, G.O. 920113 (Jan. 13, 1992) (Bol.); Decree 19789-
MlRENEM of June 25,1990 (L.G. 900803) (Aug. 3, 1990) (Costa Rica); Ley de Hidrocarburos 
R.O. 711: 15-XI-78 (Nov. 6, 1978) (Ecuador); Ley Especial de la Empresa Estatal Petr6leos 
del Ecuador (Petroecuador) y Sus Empresas Filiales R.O. 283: 26-XI-89 (Sept. 18, 1989) 
(Ecuador); Law 1182 of Dec. 23, 1985 (CONAC, Congreso Nac. 851231) (Dec. 31, 1985) 
(Para.); Mining Law of Dec. 28, 1944; Decree 2039 of Feb. 15, 1977 (Venez.); Resolution 528 
of Dec. 17, 1986; Resolution 429 of Nov. 11, 1982 (Venez.). 
69 In Chile, the state has absolute, exclusive, inalienable, and imprescriptible domain over 
all mines, deposits, and other fossil substances, despite the ownership held by individuals or 
legal entities over the land in which the deposits are contained. CHILE CONST. art. 19, , 24. 
70 See Decree of July 7,1987, L.M. 871012 (1987) (Haiti). 
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5. Collective Ownership Under Agrarian Reforms 
When land is given to collective or cooperative organizations, the 
governments often create "agrarian centers"71 to provide the super-
structure for coordinating the efforts of individual members. These 
agrarian institutions, however, lack the legal personality of corpora-
tions or other lawfully constituted and recognized organizations.72 
The agrarian centers have an organizational structure which al-
lows for member participation. There is an assembly and an admin-
istrative committee which provide direction for the association.73 
The centers also provide to their members courses and seminars on 
agricultural production.74 
The agrarian centers or cooperatives furnish a number of addi-
tional services to campesinos: they operate under a democratic or-
ganizational structure, with certain formalities; and, they usually 
have a goal of furthering education among members.75 Other forms 
of collective enterprise among producers include agrarian businesses, 
credit unions, and the campesino social companies, which receive 
property collectively from the agrarian reform institute on behalf of 
their members.76 
6. Women Under Agrarian Reform Legislation 
Agrarian reform laws often make special provisions for women. 
While the laws, by granting land to the father figure, usually fail to 
recognize that women can be the "head of the household," they do 
allow women to show that the father has abandoned the family.77 In 
this situation, the woman can receive benefits as if she were the head 
of the household.78 
In civil code jurisdictions, women usually have equal inheritance 
rights to men. Local groups that decide disputes, however, often give 
71 See Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 58 G.O. 611 (1960) (Venez.). 
72 See CASANOVA, supra note 16, at 249. The agrarian centers should not be confused with 
agricultural cooperatives, which possess legal personality and are composed of individual 
members. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. 
75 See id. at 280. 
76 See id. 
77 See DUQUE, CONTRATOS, supra note 54, at 261-62; see also CONSTITUCION DE LA REpUBLICA 
DE VENEZUELA arts. 73, 93. 
78 See DUQUE, CONTRATOS, supra note 54, at 261-62; see also CONSTITUCION DE LA REpUBLICA 
DE VENEZUELA arts. 73, 93. 
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all the real property to the sons, irrespective of the law.79 Under the 
customary tenure systems of many societies, sons, upon marriage, 
receive the real estate assets. Daughters, on the other hand, receive 
personal property, which they can take with them to their husband's 
land.8o 
B. The Modern Policy Agenda 
The 1992 congressional presentation of the U.S. Agency for In-
ternational Development (AID) stated that the objectives of foreign 
aid include: (1) the promotion and consolidation of democratic 
values, and (2) the promotion of market principles.81 Efforts to 
liberalize land laws directly affect the legal system, and, hence, 
impact intimately on democratic values. Similarly, the elimination of 
barriers to trade in land, like restrictions on sale, mortgage, and 
inheritance, promotes market principles advanced by AID. 
AID supports economic and political reforms which generate 
employment, promote broadly-based, sustainable, and environmen-
tally-sound economic growth, and encourage political freedom and 
good governance.82 Further, AID invests in human resource devel-
opment.83 This type of development is not financially sustainable 
without providing support for projects that promote child survival, 
health, and education. Property taxation is an important element in 
a strategy for financing such projects. In addition, the reform ofland 
policy, especially land registry systems, is a prerequisite to an effec-
tive system for property taxation. 
Finally, AID looks to "strengthen the institutions ... necessary to 
expand the production of goods and services. "84 In order to promote 
land market reform, legal institutions and infrastructure need to be 
developed to promote market-based principles. 
AID's Latin America and Caribbean Bureau (LAC Bureau) con-
centrates on promoting investment, employment, and favorable pol-
79 Interview with Dr. Santiago Pozo, Inspector from Cochabamba, in Bolivia (July 8,1992). 
80 Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, a specific gender analysis of tenure policy 
might be an appropriate way for governments to identify what factors inhibit women's par-
ticipation in the rural economy. 
81 See AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION: FISCAL 
YEAR 1993 10 (1992) [hereinafter AID PRESENTATION]. 
82 See id. at 12. The reforms in Mexico, Peru, and Honduras were at least nominally 
engineered to achieve these goals. 
83 [d. 
84 [d. 
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icy conditions for the private sector.85 The LAC Bureau also seeks to 
promote economic diversification, accelerated opportunities for the 
historically disadvantaged, and sound use of the environment.86 Lib-
eralization of land law, like that which has occurred in Mexico and 
Honduras, is designed to end paternalistic, restrictive economic 
practices.s7 In theory, liberalization of these laws will lead to in-
creased opportunities in the market in terms of income, investment, 
and employment. The disadvantaged were the primary beneficiaries 
under the agrarian reform programs of these four countries.ss 
These changes in property law could potentially impact the envi-
ronment. The LAC Bureau's strategic guidelines for programming 
assistance in agriculture and natural resource management empha-
size economic growth.89 Not only do the reforms address these con-
cerns on a nationwide basis, they also target their impact most 
directly on rural citizens engaged in agriculture who were the primary 
beneficiaries of such reform.90 Accordingly, in recent meetings of 
the Inter-American Development Bank's board of governors, the 
issues of poverty reduction, environment, and investment were all 
given renewed emphasis.91 
I. NICARAGUA: LAWS 85, 86, AND 88 (1990) AND DECREE 35-91 
(1991) 
A. Background 
Mter the most recent Nicaraguan presidential election, the out-
going Sandinista government passed legislation that "legalized" in-
formal confiscations and expropriations that took place under prior 
land reforms before February 25, 1990.92 A coalition led by the 
Union Nacional Opositora (UNO) then took power. The coalition 
85 See id. at 572. 
86 See AID PRESENTATION, supra note 81, at 572. 
87 See id. 
88 See id. 
89 See id. at 10. 
90 See infra text accompanying notes 378-400. 
91 Carlos Brezina, Annual Meeting: A Go-aheadfor Growth, THE IDB,June 1992, at 4 (on file 
with author). 
92 See J. David Stanfield, An Analysis of the Current Situation Regarding Land Tenure in 
Nicaragua 9 (Oct. 21, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter 
Stanfield, Analysis]; see also Hendrix, supra note 2, at 11. 
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allowed property to be converted from agrarian reform community-
held property to fee-simple private property.93 
1. Laws 85 and 86 
Laws 85 and 86 allow present occupants to maintain possession of 
property received under prior land reallocation schemes. Law 85 
applies mainly to residences and occasionally requires the occupant 
to pay, over a twenty-year period at three percent interest, for the 
unit received.94 The government retains a mortgage on the property 
to guarantee payment.95 Law 86 applies primarily to vacant lots 
where possessors wish to build housing.96 While often criticized in 
the press, these laws remain in force in Nicaragua, with minor 
amendments. 
There have been a number of allegations of corruption surround-
ing the legalization oflandholdings under Laws 85 and 86. The press 
has even referred to the decrees as the pinata, drawing an analogy 
to the children's game in which an object is destroyed to obtain 
candy.97 Because of these negative allegations, the decrees have not 
been well received. 
2. Law 88 
Law 88 protects the property of agrarian reform property owners 
and authorizes civil registrars to convert "provisional" titles, those 
issued under the agrarian reform, to "definitive" titles.98 The law also 
eliminates restrictions on alienability, setting aside the requirement 
of government authorization before transfer or sale of agrarian 
reform land.99 Under Law 88, agricultural land can be freely trans-
ferred by ordinary registrars without governmental interference. lOo 
93 See OFFICIAL GAZETTE art. 2, law 88 (Apr. 5, 1990). 
94 See OFFICIAL GAZETTE art. 1, law 85 (Mar. 30, 1990); Hendrix, supra note 2, at 11. 
95 See OFFICIAL GAZETTE art. 1, law 85 (Mar. 30, 1990); Hendrix, supra note 2, at 11. 
96 See OFFICIAL GAZETTE art. I, law 86 (Apr. 3, 1990); Hendrix, supra note 2, at 11. 
97 See Hendrix, supra note 2, at 11. 
98 The Agrarian Reform Law of 1981 allowed the state to assign, hand over, and title land 
inscribed in favor of the state. Yet, most land was never initially assigned to the state. Conse-
quently, the agrarian reform beneficiaries did not have a document which they could use as 
collateral for commercial credit. Therefore, the government issued "provisional titles" with 
basic information while it inscribed land to the state. Then, once the land had been inscribed, 
the provisional titles could be converted into definitive titles. By the 1990 election, the 
Sandinista government still had not completed this conversion. See Mireya Molina, Legislaci6n 
Agraria y su Vigencia Actual 13-14 (July 2, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author) [hereinafter Molina, Vigencial. 
99 See OFFICIAL GAZETTE art. 2, law 88 (Apr. 5, 1990). 
100 Id. 
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3. Decree Number 35-91 
On August 19, 1991, President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro signed 
a new decree affecting property rights. 101 This decree recognized 
that the concertacion, or social pact, was taking place in Nicaragua. Io2 
The decree also created the Oficina de Ordenamiento Territorial (OOT) , 
or Territorial Regulation Office, under the auspices of the Ministry 
of Finance, for the purpose of normalizing property following exist-
ing law. 103 The OOT reviewed land acquired under Laws 85 and 86, 
as well as under the agrarian reform. 104 Additionally, OOT, coupled 
with Decree No. 35-91, functioned as an action to quiet title, on a 
case-by-case basis, for the entire country. Interestingly, it was also 
given the power to draft the "territorial regulation receipt,"105 a new 
document which was broken down into revisions and dispositions.106 
B. Coverage of Laws 85, 86, and 88, and Decree 35-91 
Agrarian reform law under the Sandinista government allowed 
inheritance of agrarian reform property as well as its use as commer-
cial collateral. 107 The law, however, did not allow for unrestricted sale 
or transfer of the landlO8 and described the ownership interest as 
merely a "use right." The law asserted that property belonged to 
whomever worked the land.lOg Rental was also controlled by Sandin-
ista legislation. llo The present law allows for unrestricted transfer of 
property, and rental agreements are common. 
C. Implementation and Impact 
1. The Historically Disadvantaged 
Beginning in July 1979, Sandinista legislation aimed to support 
organized labor and campesinos, especially in the area of agrarian 
101 See Decretos del Ejecutivo Sobre la Propriedad, Decree No. 35-91 (1991) (Nicar.). 
102 See id. pmbl. §§ III, IV. 
103 See id. art. 1. 
104 See id. art. 2. 
105 See id. art. 6. 
106 See Decretos del Ejecutivo Sobre la Propiedad, Decree No. 35-91 (1991) (Nicar.). 
107 See Hendrix, supra note 2, at 8. 
108 Ley de Reforma Agraria, arts. 31-32 (Nicar.) (available at the National Assembly in 
Managua, Nicaragua). 
109 [d. art. 1. 
llO See Decree 230 of Jan. 5, 1980 (1980) (Nicar.); Decree 263 of Jan. 31, 1980 (1980) 
(Nicar.); Decree 293 of Feb. 13, 1980 (1980) (Nicar.); Decree 671 of March 11, 1981 (1981) 
(Nicar.); Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 40 (1986) (Nicar.). This law remains effective. 
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reform.lll This legislation achieved the most equal land distribution 
system in Latin America. Nevertheless, it also had a negative impact 
on the indigenous communities of Nicaragua. 
Indigenous areas were further imperiled by the subsequent move-
ment away from Sandinista reforms. 112 The communities of these 
areas, located in the Central, Pacific, and Atlantic regions of the 
country, are threatened by government attempts to use traditional 
native land to compensate former owners of agrarian reform land. ll3 
In the problem of Agro-Industria del Valle de Sebaco, the government 
proposed to use community property for compensation. The state-
held company to be used as compensation was located on indige-
nous land.n4 To date, however, traditional lands have been inalien-
able and nontransferable. ll5 
Another historically disadvantaged group is women. The Agrarian 
Reform Law and the Cooperatives Law, or Ley de Cooperativas, from 
the Sandinista era, recognized the legal equality of women and 
men. ll6 This equality is still recognized. 
Despite the changes in agrarian law in Nicaragua, several major 
obstacles to economic participation remain: (1) Where should the 
government place former "contras" so they will not again take up 
arms? (2) Where should the government locate thousands of still 
landless campesinos? (3) Assuming agreements on land ownership 
and compensation to the owners, how can an indebted nation pay 
for this? (4) Should the present occupants be evicted and, if so, how? 
The current law has not conclusively addressed these issues. 
2. Trade and Investment 
Original agrarian reform legislation prohibited the sale of land 
received under the reform. ll7 The law itself designated the title 
III See DORNER, supra note 8, at 43-46. 
112]. David Stanfield & Steven E. Hendrix, Ownership Insecurity in Nicaragua, 22 CAP. U. L. 
REv. 939, 953-54 (1994); see also STANFIELD, supra note 58, at 22-23. 
113]. David Stanfield & Steven E. Hendrix, Ownership Insecurity in Nicaragua, 22 CAP. U. L. 
REv. 939, 953-54 (1994); see also STANFIELD, supra note 58, at 22-23. 
114]. David Stanfield & Steven E. Hendrix, Ownership Insecurity in Nicaragua, 22 CAP. U. L. 
REv. 939, 953-54 (1994); see also STANFIELD, supra note 58, at 22-23. 
115]. David Stanfield & Steven E. Hendrix, Ownership Insecurity in Nicaragua, 22 CAP. U. L. 
REv. 939, 953-54 (1994); see also STANFIELD, supra note 58, at 22-23. 
116 See Mireya Molina, Leyes de Reforma Agraria 11 (Apr. 23, 1991) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author) [hereinafter Molina, Leyesl. 
117Decree 782, arts. 31-32 (1981) (Peru). 
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granted under agrarian reform as a use right. lIs As defined in the 
Civil Code, however, these titles did not strictly conform to the 
requisites of a use right. 1I9 Thus, the legislation implicitly changed 
the existing definition of use right. Further, the agrarian reform 
legislation also made the formal transfer of land illegal, thus forcing 
sales into the informal sector and discouraging formal market par-
ticipation. 12o 
A potentially grave problem involves allegations of abuse of power, 
especially regarding land. 121 Conservatives claim that the Sandinistas 
took properties under agrarian reform legislation without following 
the formalities of their own decree, let alone the expropriation 
law. 122 They also argue that the expropriation law should have been 
applied because it was neither repealed nor amended; thus, it would 
appear to govern these cases. 123 Conservatives conclude that the 
Sandinistas are guilty of "arbitrary confiscation of property."124 
Until these political and economic matters are resolved, landhold-
ers will continue to feel insecure about their land. Moreover, the 
legal system will suffer from accusations of illegitimacy. Normally, 
title to land provides the holder with a reasonable degree of legal 
certainty of ownership. In Nicaragua, however, legal title does not 
necessarily convey property ownership security.125 Thus, the expected 
benefits of the removal of ownership restrictions-increased access 
to credit,126 liberated land markets and increased investment-are 
difficult to obtain, even if the property is duly titled and recorded. 
118 See OFFICIAL GAZETTE art. 28, law 14 (1986); Administrative Rules Agreement 22, arts. 
21-22 (1986). 
119 See C. CIV. arts. 1473-82 (Nicar.). Under the Civil Code, "use rights", or usufructary 
interests, allow an individual to mortgage, buy, sell, trade or give away his interest. The 
individual cannot, however, change the form or substance of the land because, in actuality, 
the land belongs to someone else. In contrast, the Nicaraguan agrarian reform properties did 
not belong to anyone other than the beneficiary, but still could not be bought or sold on the 
market. See id. 
120 See OFFICIAL GAZETTE art. 28, law 14 (1986); Administrative Rules Agreement 22, arts. 
21-22 (1986). 
121 Hendrix, supra note 2, at 11-12, 14,20. 
122Id. 
123Id. 
124Id.; Interview with Oscar Herdocia Lacayo, President of the Leon Bar Association, in 
Leon, Nicaragua (Aug. 18, 1992). 
125 See Stanfield & Hendrix, supra note 112, at 941. 
126 Credit sources over the past ten years have preferred crops to land as collateral. 
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3. The Environment 
With the effective dismantling of the agrarian reform and the 
formal land market in disarray, the poor have been forced to invade 
fragile forests. 127 They are expanding the agricultural frontier at an 
alarming rate, causing environmentally-disastrous deforestation. 128 
Newly deforested land is exposed to soil erosion, which, in turn, 
affects water supplies as rivers become silted.129 Clearly, an effective 
land market in Nicaragua must be created. 
II. PERU: LEGISLATIVE DECREE No. 653, LEY DE PROMOCION DE 
LAS INVERSIONES EN EL SECTOR ACRARIO (1991) 
A. Background 
The study of Peruvian agrarian reform is generally divided into 
three periods: the military government of General Velasco (1968-
1975), the military government of General Morales Bermudez (1975-
1980), and the period from 1980 to the present. 130 For many years, 
Peru has contemplated amending its agrarian reform law. l3l In 1980, 
Congress passed the "Ley de Promoci6n y Desarrollo Agrario" to more 
closely align the old agrarian reform law with actual social and 
economic practice.132 An agrarian code was proposed in 1985 to 
further harmonize written law with perceived rural reality. 133 Addi-
tional modifications were introduced in 1988.134 In 1991, the Camera 
de Diputados published a bill to amend the reform. The new 1991 
127 See Stanfield, Analysis, supra note 92, at 29-30; Memorandum from Steven E. Hendrix 
to Chief Brian Rudert, USAID/Nicaragua Agriculture and Development Office 4 (Mar. 15, 
1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter Rudert Memorandum]; Telephone Interview with 
Marisol de la Cadena, Researcher, University of Wisconsin (Madison) Land Tenure Center 
(Feb. 16, 1993) [hereinafter de la Cadena Interview]. 
128 See Stanfield, Analysis, supra note 92, at 29-30; Rudert Memorandum, supra note 127, 
at 4; de la Cadena Interview, supra note 127. 
129 See Stanfield, Analysis, supra note 92, at 29-30; Rudert Memorandum, supra note 127, 
at 4; de la Cadena Interview, supra note 127. 
130 See Jose Manuel Mejia, Propiedad de la Tierra y Ley Agraria, Presentation at the Legis-
lacion Agraria y Desarrollo Economico 1 Uune 20, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author) [hereinafter Mejia Presentation]. 
131 See id. 
132 See id.; Ley de Promocion y Desarrollo Agraria, Decreto Legislativo 02 (1980) (Peru). 
133 See Mejia Presentation, supra note 130, at 1. 
134 See Proyecto Especial Desarrollo Agrario, Cooperativo y Comunal, Decreto Supremo 
029-88-AG (Mar. 1988). 
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Fujimori law reverses much of the early agrarian reform law that has 
been constitutionally fundamental to the nation. I35 
In essence, the 1991 legislation liberalizes farm credit and agricul-
tural property ownership, effectively dismantling the twenty years of 
agrarian reform. I36 Under the prior law, food production levels had 
dropped and farm credit was almost nonexistent. 137 In response, this 
reform law allows farm property to be owned by anyone, provides 
for equal access to credit, and allows farmers to use their land as 
collateral. 138 
B. Coverage 
The 1991 law permits the buying, selling, mortgaging, inheriting, 
and renting of land, including land received under the agrarian 
reform. I39 No governmental authorization is required for the trans-
fer of land. l4O In a legal sense, land has become a commercial asset.l41 
Size restrictions on land transfers, however, are still maintained. I42 
The maximum size for coastal land is 250 hectares of irrigated land. 
The maximum size for irrigated, cultivated land is sixty hectares in 
the mountains; 120 hectares in dryland; and 5,000 hectares in natu-
ral pastureland.l43 Fragmenting property into smaller pieces is also 
135 Peru Liberalizes Farm Credit, Private Property Laws, REUTER LIBR. REp., Mar. 31, 1991, 
available in LEXlS, News Library, Wires File [hereinafter Peru Liberalizes]. Indeed, commen-
tators have questioned the constitutionality of the new law. See Mejia Presentation, supra note 
130, at 2; Laureano del Castillo, Virtudes, Errores y Vacios del Decreto Legislativo 653; Una Vision 
jur£dica, in LA NUEVA LEY AGRARIA EN DEBATE 49-50 (Epifanio Baca Tupayachi ed., 1992). 
136 See Farm Credit, Ownership Liberalized in Peru,]. COMM., Apr. 2, 1991, available in Westlaw, 
Dialog Database [hereinafter Farm Credit]; Government Suspends the Power of the Central Bank 
to Set Interest Rates, Andean Group Regional Report, LARA, June 27,1991, available in LEXlS, 
News Library, LAN File; New Agrarian Reform, LATIN AM. WKLY. REp., May 23, 1991, available 
in LEXIS, News Library, LAN File. 
137 See Peru Liberalizes, supra note 135; Farm Credit, supra note 136; Interest Rates Freed, 
Foreign Banks OK'd, LATIN AM. WKLY. REp., May 16, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
LAN File; see also Decreto Supremo No. 011-91-AG arts. 2, 4 (Diario Oficial El Peruano Nos. 
95553 & 95554) (Mar. 31, 1991). 
138 See Peru Liberalizes, supra note 135; Farm Credit, supra note 136; Interest Rates Freed, 
Foreign Banks OK'd, LATIN AM. WKLY. REp., May 16, 1991, available in LEXlS, News Library, 
LAN File. 
139 See Ley de Reforma Agraria, arts. 2, 5-7 (1991) (Peru). 
14oId. art. 16. 
141 SeeJavier Escobal, Mercado de Tierras, Rentabilidad y Desarrollo Agrario, in LA NUEVA LEY 
AGRARIA EN DEBATE 1, 11 (Epifanio Baca Tupayachi ed., 1992). 
142 See Ley de Reforma Agraria, arts. 7, 12-15 (1991) (Peru). 
143Id. arts. 7, 16. 
22 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XVIII, No.1 
allowed, subject to a minimum size regulation. I44 The minimum size 
for land transfers in each resulting plot at the moment of subdivision 
is at least three hectares. 
In cases of land invasion, the new law creates an opportunity for 
a judicial inspection of the land, usually within forty-eight hourS.145 
A judge can order the disoccupation of the land within twenty-four 
hours.I46 If this order is not obeyed, the judge can order the removal 
of the invaders by public force. I47 Abandoned land reverts to the 
state if left unattended for two or more years, even if the land is left 
fallow. 148 
The constitutional concept of "he who works the land owns the 
land" has been dropped.149 Because of the entrenched doctrine in 
Latin American law of the social policies and functions of land, 
however, it is likely that some social function of this "land to the 
tiller" policy remains. I50 
C. Implementation and Impact 
1. The Historically Disadvantaged 
The new legislation does not clearly delineate how state and 
abandoned lands can be distributed to new owners.I51 It does, how-
ever, require additional steps in order to acquire land, including a 
performance bond. I52 Presumably, a performance bond is required 
to demonstrate that the land will actually be used by its occupant. 
This requirement seems entirely inappropriate for landless or land-
poor populations. I53 
144Id. 
145Id. art. 11. 
146 Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 11 (1991) (Peru). 
147Id. 
148 Id. art. 22. 
149 See Mejia Presentation, supra note 130. 
150 Reversal of the social function of land and the "land to the tiller" concept by legislative 
action has been criticized on constitutional grounds. See Guillermo Figallo A., Aspectos 
Inconstitucionales de la Ley de Promocion de las Inversiones en el Sector Agrario (undated, 
unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
151 See Mejia Presentation, supra note 130. 
152 Letter Opinion from Rolando Eyzaguirre, Instituto Libertad y Democracia, to Steven E. 
Hendrix, Legal Advisor, University of Wisconsin (Madison) Land Tenure Center Gan. 8, 1993) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter Eyzaguirre Letter Opinion]. 
153 See id. 
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Furthermore, the new law introduces several elements which may 
harm the disadvantaged. 154 For instance, this law does not refer to 
the sierra, community, or campesino groups in establishing size lim-
its.155 Unutilized land is taken by the state rather than given to 
indigenous groupS.156 Native and campesino groups are specifically 
excluded from obtaining mortgages.157 These groups are excluded 
because the law failed to amend Article 163 of the Constitution, 
which explicitly states that native and campesino community lands 
are inalienable and unmortgageable. 158 Unfortunately, this exclusion 
applies to one-third of all rural plots, or approximately 600,000 
communal small landholders, whose land rights remain only infor-
mally recognized.159 
Similar to prior law, the new law provides for land sales in the 
formal sector.160 A sale is recognized, therefore, only if inscribed by 
the registry.161 The new law allows, however, unrestricted sale, trans-
fer, mortgage, and titling of property larger than three hectares. 162 
Although many landholders easily satisfy this limit, thirty percent of 
all rural properties and the majority of the property holders are 
restricted.163 However, the informal sector has ignored, in the past, 
and can be expected to continue to ignore legal restraints. The 
legislation's impact, therefore, may be modest. 
The Peruvian government has already modified this prohibition 
against titling any land under three hectares and has recognized the 
existence of such plots. l64 This law, nonetheless, does not permit 
registration of lots less than three hectares which were created after 
154 See Ley Reforma Agraria, art. 23 (1991) (Peru). The legislation's impact on women is 
unclear. The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) has found that, in 
Peru, women are engaged in agricultural work in 86% of rural households. Candy Gourlay, 
Development: "Invisible Women" Bear Brunt of Poverty, INTER PRESS SERV., Nov. 23, 1992, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, Inpres File. 
155 See Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 23 (1991) (Peru). 
156Id. 
157Id. art. 9. 
158Rafael Ravettino F., 6-7 (July 1991) (untitled, unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author). 
159 See Eyzaguirre Letter Opinion, supra note 152. 
160 See generally RUBEN GUERVARA MANRIQUE, DERECHO REGISTRAL (1990). 
161 See id. 
162 See Eyzaguirre Letter Opinion, supra note 152. 
163 See id. 
164 See Decreto Supremo No. 018--91-AG (1991) and Decreto Legislativo No. 653, art. 16, 
which cover the titling ofland holdings less than three hectares in existence on May 3, 1991, 
the date of promulgation of the new law. 
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the cutoff date.165 Presumably, the government felt that allowing 
property owners the chance to register small parcels would deter 
them from subdividing their land in the future. 
The original law stated that in order to register a mortgage, the 
property owner needed, at a minimum, a five hectare plot.166 Legis-
lative Decree 653's administrative rules now allow landholders of less 
than five hectares, in certain cases, to register a mortgage. 167 Even if 
the Agrarian Bank of Peru denies credit, credit may be obtained 
through a third party, thereby allowing the small landholder to 
mortgage the land.168 It appears that this practice has led to nearly 
free mortgage of land for registered small landholders who are not 
members of native or indigenous communities. 169 
The Peruvian government has withdrawn funding for both the 
Banco Agrano and the Cajas Rurales de Ahorro y Credito. l7O Addition-
ally, commercial banks are not extending 10ans.l7l Consequently, the 
only sources of credit for small landholders are commercial inter-
mediaries and brokers, who rarely deal in secured mortgage lend-
ing.172 As a result, the law has had little impact on availability of 
credit for rural farmers with small landholdings. 
New procedures subsequently were announced for simplifying the 
parcelization of agrarian associations and cooperatives.173 These pro-
cedures allow the organizations to register land to each of their 
individual members.174 Despite these new procedures, in many in-
stances prohibitive transfer costs have reappeared.175 
2. Trade and Investment 
Despite Legislative Decree 653's new procedures regarding par-
celization of land, several obstacles to increasing trade and invest-
165 See id.; Steven E. Hendrix, Interplay Among Land Law and Policy, the Environment, the 
War on Drugs, Narcoterrorism, and Democratization: Perspectives on Peru sUpper Huallaga Valley, 
150 LAND TENURE CENTER PAPER l4 (1993) [hereinafter Hendrix, Interplayj. 
166 See Ley de Promoci6n y Desarrollo Agraria, D.L. 02 (1980) (Peru). 
167 See Reglamento de la Ley de Promoci6n de las Inversiones en el Sector Agrario, Decreto 
Supremo No. 0048--91-AGjOGA-OAD.UT (1991) (Peru). 
168 Id. art. 8. 
169 See Eyzaguirre Letter Opinion, supra note 152. 
170 Interview with Dr. Jorge L. Daly, LAC TECH Project Advisor, Chemonics International, 
in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 16, 1993). 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 See Eyzaguirre Letter Opinion, supra note 152. 
174 See id. 
175 See id. 
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ment remain. First, it is unclear whether the government can protect 
landholdings from terrorists and drug traffickers.176 Second, as dis-
cussed above, it is still difficult for many Peruvians to obtain mort-
gages. In theory, though, legal access to mortgages will increase the 
availability of credit, resulting in greater investment. If investment 
increases, then productivity should increase. 
Article 159 of the Constitution also effects trade and investment 
by prohibiting latifundios and proposing to gradually eliminate mini-
fundios. 177 Although the new law defines maximum and minimum 
size limits, these restrictions may prove ineffective because size limi-
tations are based on a per-person acreage.178 Individuals, therefore, 
may combine to form a company which is not restricted by a "per 
person" limit.179 
Decision 24 of the Cartagena Agreement (commonly known as 
the "Andean Common Market") includes restrictions on foreign 
ownership of land.180 Decision 24 became effective in Peru in July 
1971.181 Prior to this Presidential Decree, aliens could not directly 
or indirectly acquire or hold lands, waters, mines, or combustibles 
within a fifty kilometer zone along the frontiers. 182 Aliens also could 
not hold or acquire rural property in the border provinces or in the 
immediate vicinity of military posts.183 With the aforementioned excep-
tions, aliens generally had the same civil rights and duties as citizens.184 
Foreign investment in assets is now permitted, subject to prior 
authorization.185 In order to validate the foreign investor's rights, all 
176But see Ley de Reforma Agraria, Decreto Legislativo No. 653, art. 11 (1991) (Peru), 
which sets up a procedure for removal of trespassers. 
177 See Ravettino F., supra note 158, at 5-6. 
17SLey de Reforma Agraria, arts. 7, 12-15 (1991) (Peru). 
179 [d. According to the new law, companies may own land. This law reverses article 157 of 
the old agrarian reform law which contemplated only individual ownership. 
ISO See Agreement for Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969, Bol.-Colom.-Chile-Ecua-
dor-Peru [hereinafter Cartagena Agreement]; GALO Prco MANTILLA, DERECHO ANDINO 21 
(1989); see also Eyzaguirre Letter Opinion, supra note 152; Ravettino F., supra note 158. 
lSI Decree Law No. 18900 (1971) (Peru). 
IS2 See Cartagena Agreement, supra note 180; PICO, supra note 180, at 21; see also Eyzaguirre 
Letter Opinion, supra note 152; Ravettino F., supra note 158. 
IS3 See Cartagena Agreement, supra note 180; PICO, supra note 180, at 21; see also Eyzaguirre 
Letter Opinion, supra note 152; Ravettino F., supra note 158. 
IS4 See Cartagena Agreement, supra note 180; PICO, supra note 180, at 21; see also Eyzaguirre 
Letter Opinion, supra note 152; Ravettino F., supra note 158. 
IS5 See Cartagena Agreement, supra note 180; Prco, supra note 180, at 21; see also Eyzaguirre 
Letter Opinion, supra note 152; Ravettino F., supra note 158. 
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foreign investment must be registered at the National Commission 
of Foreign Investments and Technology (CONITE).186 
While prior law had prohibited rental ofland, the new law permits 
rental on terms agreed upon by the parties.187 This liberalization is 
important for several reasons. First, it provides access to land that 
might otherwise not be available for cultivation.188 Second, it elimi-
nates a barrier to the land market economy because land rental is 
an important element of this market.189 Third, it allows for the 
exploitation of the land so that it is not removed under provisions 
for "abandoned" land.190 
Liberalization of rental controls, however, is incomplete. The de-
cree states that rental is allowed only in cases specified by law.19l Plots 
under three hectares cannot be rented.192 The original law required 
judicial police action to evict a tenant, although the procedures 
subsequently have been relaxed.193 Because of drafting ambiguities 
in the original law, it was uncertain whether the rental term could 
be less than six years. It is now clear, however, that the term of rental 
can be as long as the parties desire.194 
3. The Environment 
The new Peruvian land law potentially could have unintended 
and unfortunate environmental effects. This law repeals Article 71 
of the Environment and Natural Resources Code,195 which prohib-
ited development activities from taking advantage of nonrenewable 
energy and natural resources. The new law also opens these lands 
to construction of oil and gas pipelines, and mining and petroleum 
installations. 196 
186 See Cartagena Agreement, supra note 180; PICO, supra note 180, at 21; see also Eyzaguirre 
Letter Opinion, supra note 152; Ravettino F., supra note 158. 
187 See del Castillo, supra note 135, at 49-53. 
188 Eyzaguirre Letter Opinion, supra note 152, at 3. 
189Id. 
190Id. 
191 See Decree Law No. 18900 (1971) (Peru); see also PICO, supra note 180, at 21; Eyzaguirre 
Letter Opinion, supra note 152; Ravettino F., supra note 158. 
192 See Decree Law No. 18900 (1971) (Peru); see also PICO, supra note 180, at 21; Eyzaguirre 
Letter Opinion, supra note 152; Ravettino F., supra note 158. 
193 See Decree Law No. 18900 (1971) (Peru); see also PICO, supra note 180, at 21; Eyzaguirre 
Letter Opinion, supra note 152; Ravettino F., supra note 158. 
194 See Eyzaguirre Letter Opinion, supra note 152, at 4. 
195 See Ley de Reforma Agraria, Decreto No. 613 (1991) (Peru). 
196 See id. 
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Article 20 of Law 653, which allows the executive to reclassify land 
use, potentially threatens the environment.197 Under prior law, a 
legislative act was required to convert parks and reserves to commer-
cial use. lg8 Conversion now may be accomplished by executive order, 
without public debate or input. l99 
III. MEXICO: ARTICLE 27 OF THE CONSTITUTION, LEy ACRARIA 
AND LEY ORcANICA DE LOS ThIBUNALES (1991) 
A. Background 
In the late 1800s, the hacienda system in Mexico allowed large 
estate holders to displace campesinos by formally purchasing land.20o 
As a result, communities were forced from their traditional lands 
onto marginal and less productive properties.201 Following the 1910 
Mexican Revolution, the Mexican government instituted agrarian 
reforms.202 These reforms, which were codified in Article 27 of the 
1917 Mexican Constitution, allowed campesinos to recover their for-
mer lands.203 The agrarian reform was extended not only to the 
formerly dispossessed communities, but also to peones who had worked 
on the large haciendas.204 This policy allowed peasants access to land 
under the ejido system, even if they could not prove that they per-
sonally had been dispossessed.205 
197 [d. art. 20. 
198 See Decree Law No. 18900 (1971) (Peru); see also PICO, supra note 180, at 21; Eyzaguirre 
Letter Opinion, supra note 152; Ravettino F., supra note 158. 
199 See Decree Law No. 18900 (1971) (Peru); see also PICO, supra note 180, at 21; Eyzaguirre 
Letter Opinion, supra note 152; Ravettino F., supra note 158. 
200 See generally CELSO FURTADO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA 254-64 
(1985); Gerardo Otero, Agrarian Reform in Mexico: Capitalism and the State, in SEARCHING 
FOR AGRARIAN REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA, 276-304 (William C. Thiesenhusen ed., 1989); 
Merilee S. Grindle, Agrarian Reform in Mexico: A Cautionary Tale, in AGRARIAN REFORM AND 
GRASSROOTS DEVELOPMENT: TEN CASE STUDIES, 179-204 (Roy L. Prosterman et al. eds., 1990). 
201 See generally FURTADO, supra note 200, at 254-64; Otero, supra note 200, at 276-304; 
Grindle, supra note 200, at 179-204. 
202 See generally FURTADO, supra note 200, at 254-64; Otero, supra note 200, at 276-304; 
Grindle, supra note 200, at 179-204. 
203 See generally FURTADO, supra note 200, at 254-64; Otero, supra note 200, at 276-304; 
Grindle, supra note 200, at 179-204. 
204 See generally FURTADO, supra note 200, at 254-64; Otero, supra note 200, at 276-304; 
Grindle, supra note 200, at 179-204. 
205 See Ignacio Ovalle Fernandez, El Ejido y Sus Perspectivas: Un Enfoque Juridico, 40 COMER-
CIO EXTERIOR 845, 845-48 (Sept. 1990); Resultados de La Encuesta Nacional Agropecuaria Ejidal 
1988,15 EL MERCADO DE VALORES 7, 7-12 (Aug. 1990). See generally Rogelio Ramos Oranday, 
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Pursuant to the ejido system, all peasants claiming land had to be 
connected with a "population nucleus. "206 Each population nucleus 
was recognized by the state and given a grant of land, or ejido, for 
its members.207 This land could not be transferred, sold, mortgaged, 
or rented.20B Inheritance was allowed if the property passed to the 
widow, children, or dependents of the ejidatario.209 Ejidos could be 
worked individually in small private farms or by groups, according 
to the government's determination.210 Since 1930, most common or 
village lands have been distributed through the agrarian reform 
process.211 
Presently, there are approximately 29,000 ejidos and agrarian com-
munities in Mexico. 212 These include 3.5 million ejidatarios and comu-
neros, or collective owners, holding 4.6 million parcels and 4.3 mil-
lion houses or urban plots.213 In total, the ejidallands represent fifty 
percent of all national territory and roughly twenty-five percent of 
the national population.214 Since 1930, only about 600 of the 29,000 
ejidos have received any type of legal certificate of possession.215 The 
overwhelming majority of ejidatarios, therefore, do not possess docu-
mentation of ownership interests.216 
As early as 1961, academics debated whether Mexico needed a 
"reform of the reform" of the ejido structure in order to b~nefit the 
private sector.217 Recent constitutional changes allow ejidos to be 
bought and sold on the private market and also remove restrictions 
on commercial ownership of rural property.21B According to former 
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the purposes of these new re-
Elementos para la Discusi6n Sobre el Ejido en Mexico, 40 COMERCIO EXTERIOR 838, 838-44 (Sept. 
1990). 
206 A population nucleus is the group of individuals living together on a single piece of land, 
the ejido. See Ovalle, supra note 205, at 845-48. See generally Ramos, supra note 205, at 838-44. 
207 See Ovalle, supra note 205, at 845-48. See generally Ramos, supra note 205, at 838-44. 
208 See Ovalle, supra note 205, at 845-48. See generally Ramos, supra note 205, at 838-44. 
209 See Ovalle, supra note 205, at 845-48. See generally Ramos, supra note 205, at 838-44. 
210 See ALAN RIDING, DISTANT NEIGHBORS 260 (1986). 
211 Memorandum from Joseph R. Thome, Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law 
School, to John Bruce, Director, University of Wisconsin (Madison) Land Tenure Center 
(Aug. 24,1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Thome Memorandum]. 
212Id. 
213 Parcels are commonly divided into two or more smaller plots. Id. 
214 Id. 
215Id. 
216Thome Memorandum, supra note 211. 
217 See, e.g., Thomas F. Carroll, The Land Reform Issue in Latin America, in LATIN AMERICAN 
ISSUES: ESSAYS AND COMMENTS, 161, 1'75 (Albert o. Hirschman ed., 1961). 
218 See Claudia Luengas, Restoring Constitutional and Legal Orders fur Empowerment and 
Participation: A View from Mexico, in 2 BEYOND LAw 11, 14 (1992). 
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forms include: effective social justice in employment, production, 
and training; an equal sharing among beneficiaries; and, the right 
to decide property uses.219 
The new reforms to Mexico's ejido system include: (1) a new 
agrarian law which establishes market principles for agricultural 
land; (2) a constitutional amendment to Article 27; (3) a law which 
regulates the newly created agrarian courts; and, (4) the creation of 
a special Attorney General for Agriculture. 22o 
B. Coverage 
In general, neither foreigners nor churches may own land in 
Mexico unless specifically authorized by the government. 221 Busi-
nesses, nonprofit organizations, and banks are permitted to own 
property, but only to the extent permitted by law.222 The new agrar-
ian law in Mexico clearly recognizes the legal status of indigenous 
communities and ejidal populations.223 For the first time, these groups 
are constitutionally protected.224 
In addition, the ejidos themselves are governed by a group assem-
bly,225 an ejidalboard,226 and an enforcement advisory group.227 Rent-
219 See President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Diez Puntos para Libertad y Justicia al Campo 
Mexicano, Address at the Official Residence in Los Pinos, Mexico (Nov. 14, 1991) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Salinas Address); see also Salvador Martinez Garcia, Transformaci6n 
Integral alEjido sin Privatizarlo: CSC, EXCELSIOR, Jan. 7, 1990, at 1; En Marcha, La Reforma 
que Necesita el Campo Mexicano, EXCELSIOR, Nov. 10, 1991, at 1. 
220 The new agrarian law provides that: (1) the government is no longer obligated to provide 
land to peasants; (2) the risk of expropriation to large estate holders is eliminated, thereby 
allowing these owners to increase investment in their land; (3) agrarian tribunals will settle 
land disputes between ejidatarios or between ejidatarios and private land holders; (4) ejidatarios 
may legally sell, rent, sharecrop, or mortgage their land. In most instances, if the transaction 
involves individuals from outside the ejido, a two-thirds majority of the ejidal general assembly 
must approve the transaction; (5) ejiditarios no longer must personally work their land. Rental 
and sharecropping of land is now permissible; (6) maximum property limits will still be 
enforced to prevent a return to latifundios; (7) joint ventures and associations with ejidatarios 
are now possible; (8) foreigners may own up to 49% of equity capital in production associa-
tions with ejidatarios. See Wayne A. Cornelius, The Politics and Economies of Reforming the Ejido 
Sector in Mexico: An Overview and Research Agenda, 23 USA FORUM 3 (Fall 1992); see also 
Wesley R. Smith, Salinas Prepares Mexican Agriculture for Free Trade, HERITAGE FOUND. REp., 
Oct. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Hfrpts File. 
221 See MEX. CON ST. art. 27. 
222Id. 
223 See id.; see also Ley Agraria, art. 9 D.O. 920811 (1991) (Mex.). 
224 See Salinas Address, supra note 219. 
225 See MEX. CONST. art. 27; Ley Agraria, arts. 21-42 D.O. 920811 (1991) (Mex.). 
226 The ejidal board includes a president, treasurer, and secretary, each with certain admin-
istrative duties. See Ley Agraria, arts. 32-42 D.O. 920811 (1991) (Mex.). 
227Id. arts. 35-42. 
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al term agreements for ejidalland now may extend up to thirty 
years.228 In order for the ejidal group to obtain credit by effectively 
mortgaging the land, it may authorize a usufruct in favor of a 
commercial institution.229 Individual landowners may also authorize 
a usufruct with their own property.230 In the case of breach of a 
guaranteed obligation, the creditor may foreclose on the property.231 
At the conclusion of the usufructary term, the property appropri-
ately reverts to either the ejido or the individual.232 
No individual within an ejido can hold more than five percent of 
the total ejidal property.233 The state is committed to promoting 
activities which protect community life, facilitate free development, 
and improve conditions.234 Finally, self-management is encouraged, 
subject to imposed limits, to guard against fraud or dispossession.235 
Latifundios are still illegal under the Mexican Constitution.236 The 
new legislation covers inheritance of rural property rights. 237 In 
order to avoid the formation of minifundios, the law requires that 
land pass to a single beneficiary.238 There is a three-month survivor-
ship requirement.239 If the ejidal member dies without a will or any 
surviving heirs, the property now passes to the ejido, rather than to 
the state.240 
Ejidal rights can be extinguished in the following manner: (1) the 
land may be transferred to another person; (2) the avecinado may 
228Id. art. 45. 
229Id. art. 46. 
230 See id. 
231 See Ley Agraria, art. 46 D.O. 920811 (1991) (Mex.). 
232 See id. 
233 See MEX. CON ST. art. 27; Ley Agraria, art. 47 D.O. 920811 (1991) (Mex.). 
234 See Ley Agraria, art. 7 D.O. 920811 (1991) (Mex.). 
235 See id. art. 14. 
236MEX. CONST. art. 27. Latifundios are land holdings owned by an individual that exceed 
the limits of a small property. See Ley Agraria, art. 115 D.O. 920811 (1991) (Mex.). Small 
property includes agricultural land encompassing up to one hundred hectares. See id. arts. 
120-33. Excluded from this category are: cotton farms up to 150 hectares; up to 300 hectares 
of land used for bananas, sugarcane, coffee, henequen, rubber, palm, vine, olives, quinine, 
vanilla, cacao, agave, prickly pear, or fruit trees, and up to 800 hectares of commercial 
forestland. See id. arts. 117, 119. Similarly, limits on property used for cattle depend on the 
number of livestock and other variables. See Ley Agraria, arts. 120-33 D.O. 920811 (1991) 
(Mex.). 
237 See Ley Agraria, art. 17 D.O. 920811 (1991) (Mex.) (discussing wills); id. art. 18 (discuss-
ing intestacy). Article 18 establishes the following priority order among survivors: (1) the 
spouse, (2) the concubine, (3) one of the children, (4) one of the other relatives, and (5) 
any other economic dependent. 
238 See Ley Agraria, art. 18 D.O. 920811 (1991) (Mex.). 
239 See id. 
240 See id. art. 19. 
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renounce his rights, in which case the land passes to the ejido; or, 
(3) the land may be lost on account of adverse possession.241 Ejida! 
land dedicated to housing may not be mortgaged, transferred, or 
sold, nor can the land be lost on account of possession.242 This rule 
does not apply, however, to the individual members' housing lots, 
which are fee-simple properties.243 In general, ejida! common land 
may not be sold, mortgaged, transferred, or lost because of adverse 
possession, unless there is approval by both the assembly and the 
Special Attorney General for Agriculture.244 
In order to promote productivity and development, ejidos now 
may form corporations, partnerships, unions, or associations.245 Eji-
da! members now may obtain certificates of private property owner-
ship.246 These certificates enable the ejidatarios, without authoriza-
tion from the assembly, to either use, rent, or sharecrop the land.247 
Ejidatarios may also sell their interest to other members of the same 
ejido, provided that neither the wife nor the children of the ejiditarios 
challenge the sale.248 
Once properties have been divided and marked, the assembly may 
give members fee-simple ownership (dominio pleno). 249 Once fee-sim-
ple ownership is assigned, members may request a registered title 
from the local public registry.25o This grant of a fee-simple interest 
for a single piece of property does not change the status or organ-
izational structure of the entire ejida! community.251 Similarly, if a 
member sells his land to a non-member, the seller retains his mem-
ber status with the ejida! group, as long as the member still owns at 
least one other property within the ejido. 252 
New reforms to Mexico's ejido system also included the appoint-
ment of an Attorney General for Agriculture office which functions 
as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.253 This office also 
241 Id. art. 20. The period for adverse possession in good faith is five years; if the occupation 
is in bad faith, the period is 10 years. Id. art. 48. 
242 Ley Agraria, art. 64 D.O. 920811 (1991) (Mex.). 
243 Id. arts. 64, 68. 
244 Id. art. 73 et seq. 
245 [d. art. 50. 
246 [d. arts. 56, 78. 
247 Ley Agraria, art. 79 D.O. 920811 (1991) (Mex.). 
248 [d. art. 80. 
249 [d. art. 81. 
250 [d. art. 82. 
251 See id. art. 83. 
252 Ley Agraria, art. 83 D.O. 920811 (1991) (Mex.). 
253 Ley Agraria, art. 134 D.O. 920811 (1991) (Mex.); see Thome Memorandum, supra note 
211. The duties of the Attorney General include overseeing dispute resolution involving 
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has elements of a national, rural legal services program because it 
offers legal assistance to poor rural populations.254 
C. Implementation and Impact 
1. The Historically Disadvantaged 
Historically in Mexico, land has caused controversies such as pro-
test marches, allegations of abuse, and violent conflicts.255 Thus, by 
proposing the most sweeping agricultural reforms since the Mexican 
Revolution, then-President Salinas challenged the country's deepest 
sensitivities.256 Salinas received widespread support for his reform 
proposal from many important campesino groupS.257 Former presi-
dential candidate Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, however, has been critical 
of the new measures.258 
Under prior law, title to the ejido belonged to the state, with 
community ejidatanos possessing only usufructary-like rights.259 Un-
der the new legislation, however, the ejido will receive title.260 Once 
authorized by the ejido assembly, each ejidatano will receive a derecho 
ejidal, or ejidal right.261 This right may be converted into a full 
freehold title (dominio pleno) if the ejido assembly decides, by a 
agricultural and ejidal lands. [d. In addition to the main Mexico City office, delegations 
throughout the country ensure general access to agrarian justice. See Ley Agraria, art. 137 
G.O. 920811 (1991) (Mex.). Although the law specifies certain required credentials, the 
Attorney General need not speak Maya or be a licensed attorney. See id. art. 140. The Assistant 
Attorneys General, however, must be lawyers with at least two years of experience. [d. art. 141. 
The Attorney General and the Assistant Attorneys General are appointed by the President. 
[d. arts. 142-47. 
254 See Thome Memorandum, supra note 211 (noting comments made by Arturo Warman, 
Director to the Procuraduria Agraria, at the Presidential Palace in Mexico City on July 27, 
1992). 
255 See, e.g., Mario de Cautin, Mexico: Farmworkers to March on Capital, INTER PRESS SERV., 
Apr. 8, 1985, available in LEXIS, News Library, Inpres File; John Hurst, Baja's Mixtecs: Life 
Amidst Squalor, LA TIMEs,June 29, 1986, at AI. 
256 See David Clark Scott, Mexican Agricultural Reforms Set Stage for a New Revolution, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 21, 1991, at 1. 
257 Manifiesto Campesino,JoRNADA (Mexico City), Dec. 2, 1991, at 26-27. 
258 Cardenas fears that commercial land markets created by the reforms will lead to a 
reconsolidation of landholdings, greater poverty in the countryside, and eventual social 
explosion. See Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, En Defensa de la Constituci6n, JORNADA (Mexico City), 
Feb. 7, 1992, at 30-31; Mexico: Agriculture & Politics, LATIN AM. WKLY. REp., Nov. 21, 1991, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, LAN File. 
259 See Thome Memorandum, supra note 211, at 7. 
260 See id. 
261 See id. 
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two-thirds majority, that all ejido members may convert their right.262 
This conversion will most likely occur in urban areas, where property 
values have greatly increased. 
The new laws allow the ejidal members to decide for themselves 
how to manage and administer their land.263 Similarly, the titling 
process under the new legislation is voluntary.264 Arguably, therefore, 
the law transfers political power in the countryside from the execu-
tive to the individuaP65 
The law distinguishes between common and parcelized areas of 
an ejido. 266 For example, the new law does not permit common areas 
to be the subject of commercial transactions.267 Furthermore, the 
ejido group determines communal property uses while individuals 
decide personal property uses.268 The law also recognizes that many 
people living on the ejido are not ejidatarios, but rather descendants 
of ejidatarios and avecinados.269 Although these individuals often rent 
and work on the ejido, they did not have, under previous law, access 
rights to commons or housing and usually did not participate in 
decision-making.270 Conversely, the new law allows rental by non-eji-
datarios on ejidos and participation in decision-making. 271 
Additionally, women are recognized as both ejidalparticipants and 
owners.272 Ejidal assemblies may give women, for their protection 
and development, special rights to an "industrial farm unit" within 
the housing area of the ejido.273 
After conversion to a fee-simple interest, the first sale of an ejidal 
lot generally can be vetoed by family members, persons who have 
worked on the land for at least a year, other ejidatarios and aveci-
262 See id. 
263 See Nueva Legislacion Agraria, GRACETA DE SOLIDARIDAD (Mexico City), Apr. 1992, at 9; 
Salinas Address, supra note 219. 
264 See Thome Memorandum, supra note 211, at 7. 
265 See id. at 6. The Procuraduria General will facilitate implementation of the new laws and 
promote understanding in the communities. It is difficult to predict, however, whether the 
Procuraduria will simply inform communities of their options or exert influence over their 
decisions. 
266 See Salinas Address, supra note 219. 
267 See id. 
268 See id. 
269 See id. 
270 See Salinas Address, supra note 219. 
271 See id. 
272 See Ley Agraria, art. 12 D.O. 920811 (1991) (Mex.). 
273 See id. arts. 63, 71. The law also allows the ejidal assemblies to grant children land within 
the housing area dedicated for their special use. See id. arts. 63, 72. 
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nados, and the qidal group.274 Although the previous law did not 
require that sales be publicly registered, Mexican law did not preju-
dice third parties who had no notice of the transaction.275 
The new laws, however, provide for registry formalities276 and 
informal agrarian dispute resolution.277 Therefore, the reforms pro-
vide greater and more efficient access to justice for the historically 
disadvan taged. 
The new legislation was intended to drastically erode the estab-
lished power base of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRJ), 
which is comprised of the traditional ejidal presidents and local 
caciques.278 It is anticipated that the PRJ will lose influence over the 
agrarian bureaucracy and campesino organizations which previously 
helped deliver the vote.279 
2. Trade and Investment 
The most important elements of then-President Salinas's strategy 
to modernize Mexico, eliminate paternalism and protectionism, bring 
the country into the world economy, and promote economic devel-
opment in rural areas, are the changes in tenure and titling in-
cluded in Article 27 of the Constitution and the provisions of the 
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).280 Unlike NAFTA, 
however, Salinas could have implemented the Constitutional changes 
without the coordination of foreign governments.281 Salinas single-
handedly opened up the countryside to foreign investment and 
corporate ownership for the first time in seventy years.282 Salinas 
stated that his purpose was to transform Mexico into a more efficient 
and modern country.283 Accordingly, Salinas averred that the new 
law would promote tenure security and therefore increase and sus-
tain investment and credit, generating employment and higher stand-
ards of living.284 
274 See id. art. 150. This veto must be made within 30 days of the notice of sale. Id. art. 84. 
275 Ley Agraria, art. 150 D.O. 920811 (1991) (Mex.). 
276 See id. arts. 148-56. 
277 See id. arts. 163-200. 
278 See Damian Fraser, Salinas Prepares to Do Battle with Old Allies, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1991, 
available in LEXlS, News Library, Fintme File [hereinafter Fraser, Salinas Prepares]. 
279 See Scott, supra note 256. 
280 Daniel James, Salinas Reforms Agrarian Reform, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1991, at F2. 
281 See Thome Memorandum, supra note 211, at 2. 
282 See Mexico Frees Its Farms, Too, Economist, Nov. 16, 1991, at 49. 
283 See Fraser, Salinas Prepares, supra note 278. 
284 Salinas Address, supra note 219. 
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As a direct result of the amendment to Article 27, the Mexican 
Department of Agriculture and Water was able to enlist the Chicago 
Board of Trade, Merrill Lynch, Spatts, and several other brokerage 
houses and Mexican financial institutions as consultants to create a 
new agricultural commodities market.285 This market is to be mod-
eled after the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.286 This amendment 
may facilitate the conversion of the ejidos to private property which 
may lead to the formation of partnerships with both domestic and 
foreign investors.287 
Joint ventures between private investors and ejidatarios have sprung 
up throughout Mexico. One such venture is the $12 million Vaquerias 
Project with Pepsico, which brought irrigation to 8,750 acres of 
staple grains. 288 Over 350 producers, including ejidatarios and small-
scale farmers, have benefitted from this project. 289 Other projects, 
valued at $68 million, are currently under way.290 In addition, the 
Bank of Mexico has established a US$5.3 billion fund for the agri-
cultural sector in anticipation of a greater demand for credit.291 
Large commercial producers, however, may not be interested in 
acquiring ejidalland or participating in joint ventures. 292 For this 
group, contract farming-where commercial entities purchase pro-
duce from small farmers in exchange for seed, technical assistance 
and fertilizer-may be more desirable. 293 On the other hand, local 
farmers with medium-sized properties seeking more land may be 
interested in the availability of ejidal property.294 
285 Alejandro Junco, The Birth of New Markets, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1992, at B13 (Special 
Advertising Section). 
286Id. 
287 See id. 
288 See id. 
289 See id. 
290 See Junco, supra note 285. Additionally, more than 1,000 joint venture projects between 
agricultural producers have been contracted. The Ministry of Agriculture reports that 150 
joint ventures between private investors and small landowners were scheduled to begin in 
1992, doubling the total for 1991. See id. 
291 See Mexico Increases Farm Loans in Anticipation of Private Investment, 1 U.S.-MEXICO 
FREE TRADE REP. 2 (May 4, 1992); Henry Tricks, Mexico Moves to Put Farming Back in Business, 
REUTER Bus. REp., Dec. 26, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reubus File. 
292 See Thome Memorandum, supra note 211, at 8. 
293 See id. 
294 See id. Some ejidallands may have tremendous economic value because they are located 
within urban or industrial areas. See id. at 2. For example, 50% of Mexico City is ejidalland. 
See id. In addition, a large percentage of the land near the U.S. border is also ejidal. See id. 
at 8. 
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By a two-thirds vote, ejidal community members may transform 
the ejidatarios into private property holders. Ejidos may also form 
joint ventures with the private sector and use their lands as collateral 
for loans. 295 Furthermore, private property holders may form joint-
stock companies in order to avoid constitutional limits on property 
size and also to raise money in the capital markets.296 
As part of the modernization process, Mexico hopes to replace 
agricultural subsidies to small landholders with investment from the 
private sector.297 The new law is designed to allow corporate invest-
ment in agriculture by creating a legal structure for joint ventures 
and by permitting informal rental arrangements to be brought within 
legal boundaries.298 LUIS Tellez, then-Undersecretary of Agriculture, 
predicted that, as a direct result of increases in productivity due to 
the new legislation and investment, the proportion of agricultural 
workers to total workers in Mexico would fall from twenty-six percent 
to sixteen percent over the next decade.299 
3. The Environment 
In most cases, ejidalland can be converted from rural to urban. 30o 
This is particularly important near Mexico City, where a large por-
tion of the land is presently ejidal but can also be used for urban 
housing.30l The law prohibits this conversion, however, if the land is 
located in an environmentally-protected zone.302 
Prior to the changes to Article 27, the administration had the 
authority to grant forest concession rights on ejidal property without 
295Damian Fraser, Mexican Farm Laws Face Radical Reform; Millions of Farmers Will Win 
Right to Own Private Property, FIN. TiMES, Feb. 11, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
Fintme File [hereinafter Fraser, Mexican Farm]. 
296 [d. 
297 See Cornelius, supra note 220, at 5. 
298 [d. 
299 See id. Commentators have blamed the old agrarian law for Mexico's food problems. 
Steven Nagourney of Shearson Lehman Brothers notes that the old law was: 
... the basic reason Mexico [was] importing 10 million tons of grain per year to 
feed itself, while preventing the trickle down so necessary to sustain and complete 
its current privatization program .... Without a growth-oriented agricultural sector, 
and a form of private land ownership that can be collateralized, Mexico [would have 
never grown] beyond the "emerging market" stage into a true "free market." 
See General Developments: Mexico, INT'L TRADE REp. (BNA), (Nov. 13, 1991), available in 
LEXIS, BNA Library, Intrad File. 
300 See Ley Agraria, art. 87 D.O. 920811 (1991) (Mex.). 
301 !d. 
302 !d. art. 88. The Mexican government has established certain zones where it wishes to 
preserve or conserve environmental resources. [d. 
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consulting the ejidatarios or the assembly.303 Under the new agrarian 
law, the ejidos may decide for themselves how to best use their 
lands.304 Some critics have attacked the new legislation on environ-
mental grounds, arguing that a policy of commercialization of land 
will promote the profit-making exploitation of agricultural produc-
tion.305 This commercialization has been associated with increased 
agricultural productivity.306 Traditional concepts of efficiency, how-
ever, ignore potential destructive effects on the environment. If 
sustainable, environmentally-friendly, agricultural production is the 
goal, then commercialization may not be the most productive method 
for growing crops. The ejidal system seems the more productive 
method because it maintains an acceptable level of output without 
allowing irreparable damage to the natural resource base. 
Critics argue that the systems of extensive agriculture which now 
utilize half of Mexican land have caused most of the country's loss 
of tropical forests and have degraded large tracts of farmland, espe-
cially in the northern arid and semi-arid areas.307 These commenta-
tors also maintain that the productivity of commercial farming is 
inflated because it receives soft loans and subsidies from the govern-
ment, and it over-utilizes energy and water supplies.308 
There are several reasons why the changes in Mexican legislation 
are important to the United States. On the one hand, if former 
President Salinas is correct, Mexico will become a competitive pro-
ducer of agricultural products in an expanded North American 
market. Mexico's success in creating domestic employment will di-
rectly lower the level of Mexican legal and illegal immigration into 
the United States, thereby negatively affecting the supply of labor in 
the American market.3og On the other hand, if the changes in Mex-
ico fail, large segments of Mexico's rural population may be dis-
placed; urban centers like Mexico City will be expected to absorb 
303 See Salinas Address, supra note 219. 
304 See Victor Manuel Toledo, Ecological Objections to the Reforms to Article 27, 24 THE OTHER 
SIDE OF MEXICO 7 (Jan./Feb. 1992). 
305 See id. 
306 See id. 
307 See id. at 7-8. 
308 See id. Another critic, Demetrio Sodi de la Tijera, has attacked the new legislation, 
arguing that it will drive the poor to cities because when the state cuts its ties with the 
campesinos, these people will have to become economically viable enough to migrate to urban 
areas, which are environmentally-ill-prepared to absorb them. Christopher Moscarella, Envi-
ronmental Issues Omitted from Agrarian Reform, NOTIMEX MEX. NEWS SERV., Feb. 24, 1992, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, Notimx File. 
309 Fausto Fernandez Ponte, Ejido, Imigraci6n y El Mercado de Mano de Obra en E. u., 
JORNADA (Mexico City), Dec. 2, 1991, at 26-27. 
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the population surplus; and the United States may face renewed 
illegal immigration. 
IV. HONDURAS: DECREE 31-92 (1992)310 
A. Background 
The Honduran history of land reform is similar to that of many 
countries in the hemisphere. 311 The main beneficiaries of the land 
reform program were large farms which were worked in common.312 
Profits were divided among the members of the group farm.313 
The original Honduran agrarian reform program did not allow 
for the unrestricted transfer of land received.314 New legislation such 
as "La Ley para la Modernizacion y el Desarrollo del Sector Agricola," 
however, which permits the titling and transfer of land held by 
peasant groups as a result of their participation in the agrarian 
reform, has been passed.315 
The new law derived from a 1989 inter-institutional, governmental 
commission report316 which examined methods of modernizing the 
old agrarian reform.317 The government reviewed the existing legis-
lation, noting problems in equity, efficiency, and sustainability.318 
The draft legislation received the support of President Rafael Calle-
jas and most major campesino groups with the exception of the 
Central Nacional de Trabajadores del Campo (CNTC).319 
310 Ley para la Modernizaci6n y el Desarrollo del Sector Agricola, D.O. 31-92 (1992). 
311 See generally Randy Stringer, Honduras: Toward Conflict and Agrarian Reform, in SEARCH-
ING FOR AGRARIAN REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 358 (William C. Thiesenhusen ed., 1989). 
312 See id. 
313 See id. 
314 See Ley de Reforma Agraria, Decree 170 D.O. (1975) (Hond.). 
315 See Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 41 (a) D.O. 21-482 (1975) (Hand.), amended in part fry 
Ley para la Modernizaci6n y el Desarrollo del Sector Agricola, art. 65 D.O. 31-92 (1992). 
316 See Roger Norton, Cronologia del Anteproyecto de Ley Para la Modernizaci6n y el 
Desarrollo del Sector Agricola 1 (Nov. 29, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author) [hereinafter Norton, Cronologial. 
317 See Mario Nufio Gamero, El Nuevo Programa para la Modernizaci6n y el Desarrollo del 
Sector Agricola Nacionall (Fall 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
318 See Secretaria de Recursos Naturales, Una Nueva Politica de la Tenencia de la Tierra: 
Hacia la Dinamizaci6n de Toda la Agricultura Hondureiia 1 (May 1991) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author) [hereinafter Una Nueva Political. 
319 See Centrales Campesinas dan luz verde a la Ley de Modernizaci6n Agricola, EL HERALD a 
(Mexico City), Dec. 17, 1991. Those who view restrictions on the sale or transfer of property 
as a violation of the new ideals of the free market support the legislation. See Norton, 
Cronologia, supra note 316, at 1. 
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B. Coverage 
1. Size Limits Remain 
A minifundio is characterized as a plot of land comprising less than 
one hectare.32o A tatifundio is defined as property one hundred to 
two thousand hectares in size, depending on location, availability of 
irrigation, and slope.321 The President of Honduras, however, through 
the Office of the Secretary of Natural Resources, may grant excep-
tions to this maximum size limit.322 
2. Rental 
Rental of agrarian reform land is now legally permitted, unless 
the land has not yet been paid for.323 There are no limitations on 
rental of nonagrarian reform land. Sharecropping, however, is not 
permitted, even under the new law.324 The International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD) reports that fifty-six percent of the 
land in Honduras is rented under terms often most favorable to 
landowners.325 
3. Buying and Selling Property and Appropriate Land Use 
Under the Honduran land reform, the beneficiaries must pay for 
the land they receive.326 The new law establishes a twenty-year term 
for payment.327 Until this obligation is settled, the state holds a first 
mortgage on the land for the amount of the adjudication.328 
Beneficiaries may inherit, mortgage, or sell the property.329 Until 
they discharge their debt, however, beneficiaries can sell their land 
320 Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 34 D.O. 21-482 (1975) (Hond.), as amended by Ley para la 
Modernizacion y el Desarrollo del Sector Agricola, art. 50 D.O. 31-92 (1992). 
321 Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 25 D.O. 21-482 (1975) (Hond.). 
322Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 25 D.O. 21-482 (1975) (Hond.), as amended by Ley para 
la Modernizacion y el Desarrollo del Sector Agricola, art. 54 D.O. 31-92 (1992). 
323 See Ley Para la Modernizacion y el Desarrollo del Sector Agricola, art. 54 D.O. 31-92 
(1992). 
324 [d. 
325 Latin America: 76 Million Poor in Rural Areas, !FAD Says, INTER PRESS SERV., Nov. 23, 
1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Inpres File. 
326 See Ley de ReformaAgraria, art. 89 D.O. 21-482 (1975) (Hond.), as amended by Ley Para 
la Modernizacion y el Desarrollo del Sector Agricola, art. 65 D.O. 31-92 (1992). 
327 [d. 
328 [d. 
329 See Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 93 D.O 21-482 (1975) (Hond.), as amended by Ley para 
la Modernizacion y el Desarrollo del Sector Agricola, art. 65 D.O. 31-92 (1992). 
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only to individuals who themselves would qualify for ownership 
under the agrarian reform legislation.330 Once the beneficiaries have 
paid for the land, the property becomes freely transferable.331 While 
this solution compromises free marketability and commercialization 
of title, it does avoid the return of latifundios.332 
As a disincentive for agrarian cooperatives to sell their land, Arti-
cle 70 of the Modernization Law imposes a tax on sales.333 If the 
cooperative sells land exceeding one hundred hectares in size to an 
entity which is not itself an agrarian reform beneficiary, the sale will 
be taxed at twenty percent of its value. 334 In addition to discouraging 
the sale of land by cooperatives, this tax is also designed to prevent 
a reconsolidation of landholdings. 335 Because the tax is levied on the 
value of the sale, the law may leave open the possibility of an 
"official" transaction price for tax evasion purposes.336 
When a beneficiary dies, any debt outstanding on the property is 
forgiven. 337 The new law, therefore, combines land access with a 
form of life insurance, assuring that heirs receive the real estate to 
which they are entitled free of economic encumbrances. 
While prior law required a ten-year period for adverse possession 
of national and ejidalland, the requisite period is now three years, 
provided the land is occupied and used. 338 The new law is, therefore, 
much more beneficial to possessors of property. 339 
C. Implementation and Impact 
1. The Historically Disadvantaged 
The new legislation strived to promote land access for the histori-
cally disadvantaged.340 Roughly three-quarters of the campesino groups 
330 The language of the statute, at this point, is contradictory. While it explicitly states that 
beneficiaries receive "dominio pleno," or fee-simple absolute, the statute, in the very next 
sentence, imposes a restriction. See id. In effect, the result is a fee-simple conditional estate. 
331 See Ley de Reforma Agraria, D.O. 21--482 (1975) (Hond.), as amended fry Ley para la 
Modernizacion y el Desarrollo del Sector Agricola, art. 64 D.O. 31-92 (1992). 
332Id. The law also requires the owner to work the land. Id. 
333 Ley para la Modernizacion y el Desarrollo del Sector Agricola, art. 70 0.0.31-92 (1992). 
334 See id. 
335 See Norton, Cronologia, supra note 316, at 1. 
336 See id. 
337 Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 84 0.0.21--482 (1975) (Hond.), as amended fry Ley Para 
la Modernizacion y el Desarrollo del Sector Agricola, art. 64 D.O. 31-92 (1992). 
338 Ley Para la Modernizacion y el Desarrollo del Sector Agricola, art. 15 0.0.31-92 (1992) 
(Hond.). 
339 Interview with Ricardo Arias, APAH Project, in Tegucigalpa, Honduras aune 16, 1992). 
340 See Una Nueva Politica, supra note 318, at 55. 
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participated in the concertacion and in drafting the legislation.341 Other 
campesino groups,342 who had elected not to participate in the con-
certacion, and who purportedly represent the majority of workers in 
rural areas, have opposed the legislation.343 Other individuals and 
groups, including the Catholic Church, have also opposed the law.344 
The new Honduran legislation allows, for the first time, equal 
access to land for both men and women.345 In fifty percent of squat-
ter settlement households in Honduras, women are the primary 
income earners.346 Only thirty percent of these women, however, 
received title to the property they occupied.347 Mter these findings 
were released, a publicity campaign was initiated which encouraged 
women to value their contributions to household duties and repro-
duction as worthy of land titles.348 Nonetheless, women compnse 
only four percent of all agrarian reform beneficiaries.349 
341 See Norton, Cronologia, supra note 316. 
342The main group opposed to the legislation is the Consejo Coordinador de Organizacio-
nes Campesinas de Honduras (COCOH). See Interview with Dr. J. David Stanfield, Researcher 
at the University of Wisconsin (Madison) Land Tenure Center (Nov. 18, 1992) [hereinafter 
Stanfield Interview). 
343 Agrarian Reform Overtaken by Modernization, 19 CENT. AM. REp. 23, 24 (Jan. 31, 1992) 
[hereinafter Agrarian Reform Overtaken). 
344For instance, Juan Ramon Martinez, president of the Instituto Nacional Agrario (INA), 
or National Agrarian Institute, resigned in opposition to the law. See id. In addition, two days 
before the law's enactment, 40,000 peasants protested the bill. See Despite Protests, New Law 
Is Passed: End to Agrarian Reform and Subsidized Credit, LAT. AM. WKLY. REp., Mar. 19, 1992, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, LAN File [hereinafter Despite Protests). The Roman Catholic 
Church has also stated that the former agrarian reform was incomplete. Indeed, while the 
Agrarian Reform Law has benefitted 400,000 families, it still has left 200,000 peasant families 
without land. See id. Although there were initial clashes between peasants and public forces 
upon enactment, the mood of the country has since calmed considerably. See Army Ultimatum 
to Peasant Squatters; Major Confrontation Arises from New Agrarian Law, LAT. AM. WKLY. REp., 
June 11, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, LAN File. 
345 See Agrarian Reform Overtaken, supra note 343; Roger Norton, Aspectos a Favor de los 
Beneficiarios de la Reforma Agraria (Nov. 28, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author) [hereinafter Norton, Aspectos). Actually, Decree 129-91 of Oct. 31, 1991 amended 
articles 79(a) and 84 of the Agrarian Reform Law to recognize that women may gain title to 
property. See Decree of Oct. 31, 1991, L.G. 920125 (1992) (Hond.). Executive Decree 12-92 
of Jan. 27, 1992, created the Comite de Integraci6n de laMujera la ReformaAgraria, a committee 
with a two-year life span. See Executive Decree of Jan. 27, 1992, L.G. 920307 (1992) (Hond.). 
346 See Nancy Sheehan, Proceedings for Gender and Natural Resources Tenure Workshop 24 
(paraphrasing comments made by J. David Stanfield, University of Wisconsin (Madison) Land 
Tenure Center) (Oct. 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
347Id. 
348Id. 
349 See Candy Gourlay, Development: "Invisible Women" Bear Brunt of Poverty, INTER PRESS 
SERV., Nov. 23,1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Inpres File. The new law should address 
these concerns. 
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While the new legislation allows for the uninhibited transfer of 
land, the only remaining incentive to redistribute would be to tax 
the practice of holding land idle.350 For a land tax to be effective, 
however, the nation must have a comprehensive cadastre, a mecha-
nism which is not presently in place in Honduras. 351 Because of this 
deficiency, land market activation thus may be difficult to achieve 
through this procedure. 
In addition, government credit to historically disadvantaged groups 
has been discontinued.352 Loans are available only through the pri-
vate sector, offered at market rates to credit-worthy borrowers.353 
Peasant group advocates have expressed concerns over these mat-
ters.354 
Another concern is consolidation in the land market.355 Because 
the new law makes it easier for cooperatives to sell land, it has been 
utilized by organizations facing pressure to payoff large commercial 
debts. 356 In 1991, for example, at least ten cooperatives sold land to 
multinational companies, mainly banana companies like Standard 
Fruit and Tela Railroad. 357 
To further boost the land market, the Honduran government has 
announced the formation of a new land bank. 358 Observers hope 
that this establishment will counter complaints regarding the mod-
ernization law and land access for the resource-poor.359 
The new legislation strips INA of its authority to assist farmers with 
small plots in obtaining official credit from the Banco Nacional de 
Desarrollo Agricola (BANADESA), or National Agricultural Develop-
ment Bank.360 In the past, INA had helped campesinos with loan 
applications and other documentation for BANADESA.361 Now, pre-
sumably, these farmers must apply directly to BANADESA. 
350 See Despite Protests, supra note 344. 
351 See John Strasma, Land Issues and Land Tax Reform in Central America, Address at the 
Meeting of the Agency for International Development (Nov. 13, 1992) [hereinafter Strasma, 
AID Address]. 
352 See Despite Protests, supra note 344. 
353 See id. 
354 See id. 
355 See New Law Annuls Agrarian Reform, 19 CENT. AM. REp. 70, Mar. 13, 1992 [hereinafter 
New Law Annuls]. 
356 See id. 
357 See Stanfield Interview, supra note 342. 
358Id. 
359 See Agrarian Reform Overtaken, supra note 343, at 23-24. 
36°Id. 
361 See Stanfield Interview, supra note 342. 
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With regard to indigenous groups, the impending impact of the 
legislation remains unclear. Because indigenous groups in Hondu-
ras have historically used their lands communally, individual owner-
ship previously has been inappropriate.362 
2. Trade and Investment 
The new law reduces the threat of expropriation.363 Although 
farms exceeding the landholding ceilings and lands abandoned for 
more than eighteen months-or two years in cases of natural disas-
ter-will still be subject to expropriation, in all other cases, this 
threat appears less likely.364 Because landholders may now rent idle 
land, this land will be brought into production, thus avoiding the 
risk of expropriation.365 
By transforming land into a commodity which can be bought and 
sold to qualified beneficiaries, Honduras is attempting to both pre-
vent a return to latifundios and to promote an active land market 
tailored to the historically disadvantaged.366 In addition to dealing 
with land issues, the new legislation also eliminates price controls 
on agricultural products and privatizes the storage facilities of the 
Instituto Hondureiia de Mercado Agricola (IHMA), or Honduran Ag-
ricultural Marketing Institute.367 Furthermore, the law also elimi-
nates restrictions on foreign investment for timber production.368 
3. The Environment 
Although the new legislation allows property to be held with 
fee-simple interests, property holders cannot freely utilize timber 
resources.369 A special provision requires State Forest Administration 
approval before cutting trees for commercial purposes, whether on 
public or private land.370 The structure of this provision is unusual, 
362 Lisa Swenarski, Hondurans Stake Their Claim, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 28, 1990, 
at 12-13. 
363 See Roger D. Norton, The Law for Agricultural Modernization and Development 2-3 
(Nov. 18, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Norton, Modern-
ization and Development]. 
364 [d. 
365 See New Law Annuls, supra note 355, at 70. 
366 See Norton, Modernization and Development, supra note 363. 
367 See Norton, Cronologia, supra note 316. 
368 See id. 
369 See Ley para la Modernizaci6n y el Desarrollo del Sector Agricola, art. 73 D.O. 31-92 
(1992) (Hond.). 
370 [d. 
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however, because owners receive full ownership of forest assets lo-
cated on their land, provided they voluntarily agree to a forest 
management plan approved by the government. 371 
In addition, the new legislation eliminates state participation in 
the processing and marketing of wood and wood products,372 while, 
at the same time, dismantling the log export ban.373 The legislation 
also provides for a phasing out of export commissions paid to the 
government and requires that stumpage fees reflect the true cost of 
reforestation.374 In general, unused, privately-held land is subject 
to expropriation under the agrarian reform and may be sold to 
beneficiaries.375 Land which remains forested is not necessarily "un-
used" under the new legislation.376 The new law, therefore, removes 
any incentive for deforestation simply to preserve property rights.377 
V. COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE FOUR JURISDICTIONS 
A. Coverage 
The Appendix contains summaries of what Nicaragua, Peru, Mex-
ico and Honduras have done on each of the major restrictions on 
property rights. 
B. Implementation and Impact 
1. The Historically Disadvantaged 
Privatization or individualization of property rights may be the 
natural evolution of an economy moving toward market-based prin-
ciples. It also may be the product of an imposed legal change.378 In 
either case, land policies attempt to strike a balance between security 
of private ownership and social needs which may limit that secu-
371 See Norton, Modernization and Development, supra note 363, at 5. 
372 ld.; see Nufio, supra note 317, at 8. 
373 See Nufio, supra note 317, at 8. 
374 See Norton, Modernization and Development, supra note 363, at 5; Secretaria de Recur-
sos Naturales, Proyecto de Ley Para la Modernizaci6n y el Desarrollo del Sector Agricola: 
Documentos de Apoyo (Sept. 9, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
375 See Ley para la Modernizaci6n y el Desarrollo del Sector Agricola, art. 51 (b) D.O. 31-92 
(1992) (Hond.). 
3761d. 
377 See id. Previously, because forests were considered vacant lands, trees were cut to avoid 
expropriation. INA required that 90% of the land be covered in permanent crops. None of 
the regulations or procedures, however, addressed land suitability. See GEORGE JOHNSTON ET 
AL., HONDURAS NATURAL RESOURCE POLICY INVENTORY 5 (1990). 
378 See Bruce, African Experience, supra note 8. 
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rity.379 Social policy, deeply rooted in Latin American legislation, is 
still an important factor, especially among the historically disadvan-
taged. 
Creation of individual ownership signifies the elimination of both 
group rights and many use rights held by others. This creation 
places the new owner in a position of power in relation to other 
community members. For example, in Kenya, this process usually 
designates the husband as the owner of the land, eliminating pro-
tections that wives had previously enjoyed under indigenous sys-
tems.380 As land becomes a commodity, it can be taken from the 
families despite the fact that women and children continue to do a 
large part of the agriculturallabor.381 For these groups, privatization 
of tenure actually creates tenure insecurity. 
The development community has much experience with Mrican 
countries seeking to renovate indigenous land tenure systems using 
modern legal concepts. In English-speaking West Mrica, particularly 
in Nigeria and Ghana, the courts developed a common law of 
"family land" out of a variety of tribal lineage-ownership systems.382 
Judges seeking to recognize such a system generally relied on analo-
gies to the English concepts of joint ownership and ownership in 
common.383 Courts permitted transactions in family land with the 
consent of all interested family members.384 This required a clear 
definition of the "family." Even if the definition had been unambi-
guous in application, as a practical matter it was difficult to obtain 
the necessary signatures. Consequently, the trust, a Western legal 
concept, was adopted.385 Under the trust, several persons would be 
registered as trustees for the lineage, clan, or other group.386 This 
model was introduced in western Nigeria in 1959 and adopted in 
Kenya in 1968.387 
In a project studying lowland, forest-dwelling indigenous people 
in Brazil, the World Bank found that "land regularization in and of 
itselfwill not be sufficient to protect indigenous peoples' land secu-
379 See, e.g.,John A. Humbach, Law and a New Land Ethic,]. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE 13-15, 
24 (FalI1990). 
380 See Bruce, African Experience, supra note 8. 
381 See id. 
382 See id. 
383Id. 
384Id. 
385 See Bruce, Mrican Experience, supra note 8. 
386Id. 
387Id. 
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rity .... Thus, even in those projects where large amounts of land 
were set aside, indigenous people remained vulnerable to the de-
struction of their resource base and their cultural integrity. "388 
Formal land markets with commercial titles may present difficul-
ties for indigenous populations. For example, purchasing property, 
the most common method of land acquisition, creates problems for 
lowland South American Indians, who are subsistence producers 
and not yet fully integrated into the market economy.389 Similarly, 
indigenous populations' notions of occupancy and ownership may 
differ from those under formal law. 390 
The majority of indigenous and tribal groups in Latin America 
were dispossessed of their land long before the agrarian reforms.391 
Many are now landless rural workers, tenants, or farmers on lands 
often too small to satisfy their minimum subsistence needs.392 Agrar-
ian reform laws and programs, often established in the 1960s and 
1970s, aimed to assist the communal arrangements of indigenous 
peasant agriculture.393 These efforts, however, have received little 
support over the past two decades and redistribution of land has 
generally ended.394 For these individuals, any steps to promote equal-
ity of land rights with the rest of the national population may be an 
advancemen t. 395 
If property is freely transferable, a consolidation of landholdings 
is possible. If it does not create efficiency, and, thus, an automatic 
economic benefit, this consolidation may not occur. The grant of 
freehold interests allows the market to determine ownership. If the 
market functions properly, therefore, property will flow to its most 
productive use. Generally, large estates are not necessarily more 
productive than small estates. Thus, it may be unlikely that large 
388 Alaka WaH & Shelton Davis, Land Regularization in Special Ameriindian Components of 
Bank-Funded Projects in the LAC Region, 1991 WORLDBANK: LATIN AM. & CARIBBEAN REGION 
ENV'T DIVISION at ii. 
389 [d. 
390 [d. Many lowland South American indigenous groups perceive themselves as "occupying" 
large areas of land, but do not claim to be "owners" of the land in the sense that they do not 
claim exclusive use. See id. In contrast, colonists may view occupation as an entitlement to 
exclusive use in conformity with formal law. See id. 
391 Plant, supra note 11, at 1-2. 
392 [d. 
393 [d. 
394 [d. 
395 [d. For the indigenous communities still occupying traditional lands, legislation could 
recognize and protect these rights if greater security for these peoples is a policy objective. 
Plant, supra note 11, at 1-2. 
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landholders will automatically consolidate property,396 even though 
the governments would be legally allowing this possibility. 
The conclusion that consolidation of landholdings is unlikely 
depends on the assumption that the market is functioning properly 
and small landholders can take better advantage of economies of 
scale. This assumption, however, may not be accurate. Latin Ameri-
can small landholders may have less capacity to absorb risk and less 
access to capital than do persons holding larger estates. These fac-
tors, if present, might cause consolidation to occur. 
Individualization of tenure can negatively impact the rights of 
women. Under traditional forms of ownership, all members of a 
given community have an interest in the land held collectively.397 In 
Kenya, individualization of tenure has led, in some cases, to the 
dispossession of women, with all property rights passing to the men.398 
As property rights change, rural women, in particular, acquire spe-
cial needs.399 
Property law liberalization might be one element of a broader 
program for democratization of the political economy. Liberaliza-
tion in itself, however, is unlikely to be the sole instrument for social 
reorganization. Reform also might be linked to changes in the 
banking sector to provide greater participation in the political econ-
omy.400 
2. Trade and Investment 
While most Latin American countries have addressed trade bar-
rier issues in the input, capital, and foreign trade markets, the land 
market remains the most imperfect economic market. Activation of 
396 Ecuador is moving away from the latifundio via the market. See generally Carlos Camacho, 
Evaluaci6n del Proceso de Cambio en la Tenencia de la Tierra en la Sierra Norte y Central 
(1964-1991), in 1991 INSTITUTO DE ESTRAGIAS AGROPECUANAS. 
397 Joy K. Green, Evaluating the Impact of Consolidation of Holdings, Individualization of 
Tenure, and Registration of Title: Lessons from Kenya, 1987 U. WIS. (MADISON) LAND TENURE 
CENTER. 
398Id. In those cases, the women in the greatest danger were widows, those without off-farm 
income and those who had borne only daughters. Id. 
399 For example, women may need greater access to collateral if governments intend to make 
commercial credit available to them. One study found that, in Zimbabwe, women were denied 
access to credit because they lacked control over assets. See generally Ruvimbo Chimedza, 
Savings Clubs: The Mobilization of Rural Finances in Zimbabwe, in 1984 INT'L LAB. ORGANI-
ZATION. 
400The development of banks specifically capable of dealing with small-scale agriculture is 
a possibility. 
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land markets often is still recommended to provide land access for 
the historically disadvantaged, to relieve pressures on fragile lands, 
to enhance agricultural productivity and to promote a sustainable 
environmental policy. 
Traditionally, land reform has been used where market mecha-
nisms fail to allocate land resources effectively on account of trade 
barriers.401 In contrast, activation of land markets works within the 
market structure by removing or avoiding these barriers, rather than 
seeking a reallocation of resources through the political process. 
The issue, then, becomes what steps are necessary to achieve an 
effective land market. 
There is a growing body of case study data and new theoretical 
literature addressing the functioning of land markets.402 The three 
major constraints to the formal land market are: (1) insufficient 
demand due to small-scale farmers' lack of equity to purchase land, 
as well as high transfer costs, (2) insufficient supply of land at prices 
affordable to small-scale farmers, and (3) government administra-
tion, including legal, fiscal, and bureaucratic red tape, and lack of 
adequate registries.403 
Latin America really has two land markets: a formal market, char-
acterized by recorded titles and lower utilization rates; and an infor-
mal market, characterized by undocumented landholdings, usually 
held by the historically disadvantaged. Often, economic develop-
ment policy aims to integrate the markets, providing the historically 
disadvantaged with access to land from the formal market.404 
USAID/Guatemala'sFundaci6n del Centavo (FUNDACEN) project 
highlighted at least two problems in land markets and land purchase 
programs, in addition to the registry and title marketability difficul-
401 DORNER, supra note 8, at 75. 
402 See generally Shearer, supra note 11. 
403DoRNER, supra note 8, at 77. 
404Toois used to integrate the markets include land taxation, land and mortgage banks, 
titling and cadastre systems (linked via a multipurpose land information system, or MPLIS) , 
extension and education, land purchase programs, elimination of subsidies for cattle and 
capital equipment, land-for-infrastructure programs, and other policy instruments. See gener-
ally Michael Carter & Dina Mesbah, Economic Theory of Land Markets and Its Implications for 
the Land Access of the Rural Poor, 1990 U. WIS. (MADISON) LAND TENURE CENTER. Elimination 
of restrictions on land and titling, by itself, probably will not lead to land market activation. 
They will, however, be more likely to succeed if they form part of a more comprehensive 
approach to the land market problems which involve other policy instruments. See generally 
Randy Stringer, Farmland Transfers and the Role of Land Banks in Latin America, 1989 U. WIS. 
(MADISON) LAND TENURE CENTER; J. David Stanfield, Rural Land Market Implications of 
Titling and Registration Programs in the Latin America and Caribbean Region (1991) (un-
published manuscript, on file with author). 
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ties.405 First, there is a general lack of start-up capital for nongovern-
mental organization (NGO) projects like FUNDACEN.406 Second, 
local NGOs are more likely to already possess knowledge of soil 
quality and use, roads and markets that larger organizations like 
FUNDACEN could only acquire at great cost.407 For this reason, local 
NGOs may provide the preferred organizational structure and level 
for future land-purchase programs. 
Rental programs with options to purchase, documented by 
USAID/EI Salvador and the University of Wisconsin (Madison) Land 
Tenure Center, and temporary, reversible foreclosure mechanisms, 
documented by USAID/Dominican Republic and the Land Tenure 
Center, are examples of highly successful land bank programs.408 In 
both cases, the USAID mission has been able to use private sector 
initiative to implement the program, with nearly one hundred per-
cent collection rates and little or no collection costS.409 As long as 
program users pay, the programs become sustainable in the long 
term without continued donor financial support. 
Elimination of restrictions on property ownership and barriers to 
trade may not always produce the desired outcome. For instance, in 
Kenya, the privatization of tenure to promote land markets did not 
appear to result in purchases of "economically viable" properties.410 
Instead, sellers sold only a portion of their property, retaining the 
other part as security against landlessness.411 Many purchasers bought 
land as an investment: to be used as security for loans, to be farmed 
under tenancy, to be held for speculative purposes, or to provide for 
the eventual needs of the buyer's children.412 Most purchases have 
been made by persons with nonagricultural sources of income, rather 
than by successful farmers hoping to expand their holdings.413 While 
405FUNDACEN is the "Fundaci6n del Centavo," or the Penny Foundation. For a general 
discussion, see Elizabeth G. Dunn, The FUNDACEN Experience: Factors for Success and Failure 
in a Guatemalan Land Purchase-Sale Program, 1992 U. WIS. (MADISON) LAND TENURE CENTER 
107. 
406Id. 
407 See id. 
408John Strasma, Making Land Banks Viable: Two Successful Approaches to Collecting 
Loans Made to Small Farmers in Central America and the Caribbean (Dec. 1990) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the author) [hereinafter Strasma, Viable]. New land bank 
programs have begun in Costa Rica (Decree No. 20574, G.O. 910805, July 8, 1991) and 
Panama (Law 22, Aug. 5,1991 (Pan.)). 
409 See Strasma, Viable, supra note 408. 
410 See Bruce, African Experience, supra note 8, at 19. 
4ll Id. 
412Id. 
413Id. 
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this practice might benefit the macro-economy in terms of reward-
ing productivity, providing retirement homes and retreats for urban 
citizens, or giving risk diversification for traditional nonfarmers, it 
may have a negative impact on local farmers. 
In the case of Kenya, the landholders were not economically 
secure even though restrictions on their property ownership were 
removed.414 The benefits of liberalization in the land market, there-
fore, have not materialized.415 Thus, the liberalization of property 
rights must be an element in a broader strategy to promote eco-
nomic development and opportunities, especially among vulnerable 
groups. 
3. The Environment 
The "stakeholder interest" literature is relevant to the changes 
occurring in these four countries.416 Land titling provides incentives 
to individual landowners to engage in environmentally- and agricul-
turally-sound practices.417 Furthermore, people with tenure security 
may depend less on reserves, and thus may be more willing to plant 
trees and other long-term cropS.418 Conversely, if landholders lose 
security in land ownership, they lose an incentive to plant trees. 419 
This may be especially true on agrarian reform land, where owners 
cannot freely transfer their property without government authoriza-
tion. 
The recent changes in land rights in the four countries examined 
convert agrarian reform beneficiaries into fee owners of property. 
These changes give the beneficiaries a stronger interest in preserv-
ing and defending their land. The expected result, therefore, may 
be land use which is more environmentally-friendly. 
414Id. 
415 Bruce, Mrican Experience, supra note 8, at 19. 
416 See, e.g., Benjamin L. Crosby, Stakeholder Analysis: A Vital Tool for Strategic Managers, 
TECH. NOTES, Vol. 2 (USAlD Implementing Policy Change Project) Mar. 1992, at 1. 
417 See William C. Thiesenhusen, Implications of the Rural Land Tenure System for the Envi-
ronmental Debate: Three Scenarios, 26]. DEVELOPING AREAS 1, 21-23 (1991). For Haiti, see 
generally, PETER C. BLOCH ET AL., LAND TENURE ISSUES IN RURAL HAITI (1988). 
418John W. Bruce & Louise Fortmann, Agroforestry: Proprietary Dimensions (1989) (un-
published manuscript, on file with author). For Mrican forestry, fuelwood, and resource 
conservation projects, see John W. Bruce, Land Tenure Issues in Project Design and Strategies 
for Agricultural Development in Sub-Sahara Africa, 1992 U. WIS. (MADISON) LAND TENURE 
CENTER [hereinafter Bruce, Africal. 
419 See generally POLICY TAXONOMY AND ANALYSIS OF POLICIES AFFECTING NATURAL RE-
SOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Agency Int'l Dev., Bureau of Sci. & Tech. eds., 1990) 
[hereinafter POLICY TAXONOMY l. 
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Still, Latin American government-sponsored colonization and agrar-
ian reform programs often directly conflict with natural resource 
conservation objectives.42o These reform programs often require prop-
erty owners to use, or risk losing, their land. As a result, property 
owners often deforest their land to satisfy the utilization require-
ment.421 
Perhaps most importantly, by creating marketable titles, govern-
ments may promote land markets within existing land supplies, 
rather than extend their agricultural frontiers into forested areas.422 
Governments also may examine the repeal of restrictions on leasing 
and mortgaging, restraints that chill the market for land.423 From a 
legal standpoint, making land titles marketable is a prerequisite for 
an active, formal market in real estate. This, in turn, may remove 
incentives for deforestation. It also may allow individuals to purchase 
land where agriculture is appropriate, not only where the govern-
ment wants the beneficiaries to be placed.424 
Nevertheless, no tenure system, not even one which provides for 
registered freehold interests, can totally safeguard against destruc-
tive land use. For example, farmers sometimes may need to maxi-
mize short-term production in order to survive, despite long-term 
resource costS.425 Further, no tenure system can completely ensure 
against the breakdown of communal tenure arrangements if there 
is overpopulation or poor technical support. 426 
Security of access and tenure to forested areas-whether by a 
formal concession system, usufruct rights, or ownership interests-
will encourage land use in a more commercially- and environmen-
tally-sustainable manner. Normalization of tenure in forested areas 
may lead to increased investment in long-term, sustainable forestry 
420 See id. at 55. 
421 See generally GEORGE JOHNSTON ET AL., U.S. AGENCY INT'L DEY., THE GREEN BOOK (draft 
1992) [hereinafter GREEN BOOK]. See also Theresa Bradley et a!., Costa Rica National Resource 
Policy Inventory 6 (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Agency for International 
Development). Under its new law, Honduras has made forestry an accepted land use. See Ley 
para la Modernizacion y el Desarrollo del Sector Agricola, art. 51(b) D.O. 31-92 (1992) 
(Hond.). Such a policy removes the incentive to cut trees in order to guard against having 
the land taken away. 
422 See POLICY TAXONOMY, supra note 419. 
423 See GREEN BOOK, supra note 421. 
424 For example, in Costa Rica, the government has sometimes placed beneficiaries on land 
unsuitable for agriculture. See Bradley, supra note 421. 
425 See Bruce, Africa, supra note 418, at ix. 
426 See JOHNSTON, supra note 377, at 5. Notably, formal government ownership has not led 
to environmental management or sustainable resource use. [d. 
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practice, resulting in higher valued land usage and increased plant-
ing of trees. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING 
LEGISLATIVE REFORMS 
A review of the experiences in Nicaragua, Peru, Mexico and Hon-
duras suggests that the time has come in Latin America to graduate 
from past land reforms and enter the market. In market economies, 
the landless may be treated as potential small-scale farmers rather 
than as permanent political beneficiaries, dependent on under-
funded government agencies.427 Removal of restrictions on agrarian 
properties, however, may present complications. For instance, women, 
poor people and indigenous groups have special needs. Further, the 
government may have to balance the desires of the private sector, 
the needs of the historically disadvantaged and the goals of a sus-
tainable environmental policy. 
The removal of restrictions on agrarian property is a logical part 
of economic modernization. Indeed, removal is often regarded as a 
prerequisite to economic development. The mere elimination of 
restrictions, however, may not guarantee economic progress. While 
this measure may guarantee increased security of ownership, the 
following other factors may make investment less attractive: inappro-
priate banking policies, the lack of an effective property registry and 
cadastre system, the overall availability of credit and technical assis-
tance,428 produce markets, and pricing of products. Thus, the elimi-
nation of ownership restrictions is merely one element of a broader 
development strategy for economic revitalization. 
Transaction costs with group structures in land ownership have 
led to criticisms of agrarian reform laws and, in particular, of agrar-
ian centers. A great deal of literature has focused on this problem 
of transaction costs in agrarian reform legislation, noting such difficul-
ties as: the trouble of securing group consent to undertake land 
improvements, free-rider problems, and other problems associated 
427 John D. Strasma & Rafael Celis, Land Taxation, the Poor; and Sustainable Development, in 
POVERTY, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA 143 (Sheldon Annis 
ed.,1992). 
428 Randy Stringer argues convincingly that establishing a land-financing system in Latin 
American countries may represent a viable institutional mechanism to assist some landless 
people in overcoming difficulties caused by land market imperfections. See Stringer, supra 
note 311, at 11; see also Randy Stringer, A Profile of Land Markets in Honduras (1989) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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with governmental bureaucracies. This Article does not extensively 
address these economic difficulties; instead, it legally analyzes these 
problems. Because of this legal emphasis, this study may appear 
biased against the new legislation in terms of its social and environ-
mental impact. 
In conclusion, in terms of policy guidance for Latin American 
governments and the foreign donor community, a number of issues 
emerge from the discussion of property rights liberalization. Any 
future property law modernization effort might consider the follow-
ing operational guidelines taken from the experiences of Nicaragua, 
Peru, Mexico, and Honduras: 
1. Restrictions on rights to mortgage should be reevaluated. No 
amount of foreign donor money, projects, or technical assistance 
can create asset-based, secure, private sector lending in agriculture 
as long as commercial lenders lack a reasonable assurance of repay-
ment. Accordingly, access to collateral, now prohibited in most ju-
risdictions, must be granted. 
Peru originally set a minimum holding limit of five hectares for a 
mortgage; subsequently, it has backed off this position. The market 
is in a better position than the government to determine the mini-
mum size of property for a mortgage. As the experiences of the 
other three jurisdictions suggest, the lack of any minimum size limit 
may be desirable. 
2. Reforms may also allow farmers to decide how they would like 
to hold property, rather than through governmental mandate speci-
fYing tenure form, such as individual ownership. If market principles 
are used and the goal is increased productivity, the market repre-
sented by the individual farmers-and not the government-is in 
the best position to determine whether collective or private owner-
ship is most productive. In Mexico and Honduras, for example, 
governments provide for individual choice of form of ownership. 
Additionally, in Mexico, indigenous communities receive special 
protection, unless the communities themselves democratically de-
cide to individualize their holdings. 
3. Countries may consider the right to sell or transfer land freely. 
In Mexico, a maximum size on individual holdings discourages the 
return of large estates. Other steps may be undertaken to stimulate 
land activation and prevent consolidation of landholdings. 
4. In Honduras, the government recognizes forestry as an appro-
priate land use in conformity with the social function of land. This 
recognition prevents deforestation from being a usage of the land 
simply to avoid expropriation. 
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5. Governments might explore the feasibility and practicability of 
granting mineral and subsoil rights, where subsoil wealth is located 
on their land, to indigenous communities. As a result, wealth from 
the central government will be transferred to the communities, 
thereby providing benefits at the community level. None of the four 
countries have taken this step in the modernization of their prop-
erty. Given the trend toward government support for traditionally 
disadvantaged groups and the removal of restrictions, however, the 
implementation of this transfer may be the next logical step for 
some countries. 
6. Governments must identify, monitor, and evaluate the impact 
of legislative modernization in several areas, including: the conse-
quences on the historically disadvantaged, trade and investment, 
and the environment. Governmental monitoring of the entire na-
tional economy will not be cost effective. Sampling and survey tech-
niques, however, may be used to provide policymakers with reliable 
information concerning the results of legislative changes. 
Finally, additional development research suggests that these meas-
ures will be most effective if combined with other means to ensure 
an active land market, a sound environmental policy, and increased 
opportunities for the historically disadvantaged. 
APPENDIX 
Summary and Simplification of Changes for Nicaragua 
Inheritance 
Mortgage 
Land usage requirements 
Sale or transfer 
Land size 
Rental 
"Social function" 
Allowed, as before. 
Allowed, as before. 
None, as before. But, the threat of expropriation 
remains for unused land. 
Restrictions removed. No government approvals now 
needed. 
Latifundios still subject to the threat of expropriation, as 
before. 
Controlled. Old law unchanged. 
Remains in the law. New interpretation? Meaning unclear. 
Summary and Simplification of Changes for Peru 
Inheritance 
Mortgage 
Land use requirements 
Sale or transfer 
Land size 
Rental 
"Social function" 
Restrictions eliminated. 
Now allowed. Special conditions if lot is less than five 
hectares. 
No particular requirements. Land not used remains 
subject to the threat of expropriation. 
Restrictions eliminated. 
Restrictions remain. 
Restrictions eliminated. 
Land treated as an economic good, not a social good. 
"Social function" of land eliminated or simply a new 
interpretation? New meaning unclear. 
Summary and Simplification of Changes for Mexico 
Inheritance 
Mortgage 
Land use requirements 
Sale or transfer 
Land size 
Rental 
"Social function" 
Restrictions eliminated. Inheritance now permitted, with 
safeguards against minifundios. 
Prohibitions remain for ejidal commons or housing. 
Individual property can now be mortgaged. 
As before, unused land reverts to the state. 
Prohibitions remain for ejidal commons or housing. 
Individual property can now be sold or transferred. 
Limits remain, although they are relaxed. Latifundios 
remain illegal. 
Restrictions eliminated for individual land. Most, but not 
all, restrictions removed for ejidalland. 
Concept remains, although implementation has changed. 
Summary and Simplifications of Changes for Honduras 
Inheritance 
Mortgage 
Restrictions eliminated. 
Restrictions eliminated. 
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Land use requirements 
Sale or transfer 
Land size 
Rental 
"Social function" 
Owner must work or use the land. But threat of 
expropriation is much less. 
Many restrictions eliminated. But still must sell or 
transfer land only to individuals who meet the criteria of 
the agrarian reform until the land is fully paid for. 
Latifundios still subject to the threat of expropriation, as 
before. Amended limitations on size remain, as before. 
Restrictions eliminated, except that the owner must have 
fully paid for the land prior to renting it. 
Remains in the law. New interpretation? New meaning 
unclear. 
Summary and Simplification of Changes on Inheritance 
Nicaragua 
Peru 
Mexico 
Honduras 
Allowed, as before. 
Now allowed. 
Restrictions removed. Inheritance now permitted, with 
safeguards against minifundios. 
Now allowed. 
Summary and Simplification of Changes on Mortgages 
Nicaragua 
Peru 
Mexico 
Honduras 
Allowed, as before. 
Now allowed. Special conditions if the lot is less than five 
hectares. 
Prohibitions remain for ejidal commons or housing. 
Restrictions eliminated. 
Summary and Simplification of Changes on Land Use 
Requirements 
Nicaragua 
Peru 
Mexico 
Honduras 
None, as before. But, the threat of expropriation 
remains. 
No particular requirements. Land not used remains 
subject to the threat of expropriation. 
As before, unused land reverts to the state. 
Owner still must work or use the land. 
Summary and Simplification of Changes on the Sale or 
Transfer of Property 
Nicaragua 
Peru 
Mexico 
Honduras 
Restrictions removed, no government approvals now 
needed. 
Restrictions removed. 
Prohibitions remain for ejidal commons or housing. 
Individual property can now be sold or transferred. 
Many restrictions eliminated. But, still must sell or 
transfer land only to individuals who meet the criteria of 
the agrarian reform until the land is fully paid for. 
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Summary and Simplification of Changes on Land Size 
Nicaragua 
Peru 
Mexico 
Honduras 
Latifundios still subject to the threat of expropriation, as 
before. 
Restrictions remain. 
Limits remain, although they are relaxed. Latifundios 
remain illegal. 
Amended limitations on size remain, as before. 
Summary and Simplification of Changes on the Rental of Land 
Nicaragua 
Peru 
Mexico 
Honduras 
Controlled, old law unchanged. 
Restrictions removed. 
Rental of individual property now permitted. Most, but 
not all, restrictions removed for ejidalland. 
Restrictions eliminated, except the owner must have fully 
paid for the land prior to renting it out. 
Summary and Simplification of Changes on the Social 
Function of Land 
Nicaragua 
Peru 
Mexico 
Honduras 
Remains in the law. New interpretation? Meaning unclear. 
Land treated as a commodity; an economic good, not a 
social good. 
Concept remains, although implementation has changed. 
Concept remains, although implementation has changed. 
Summary of Current Status of Agrarian Property Law 
Country Inheritance Mortgages Land usage rules Property alienation Size limits Rental Social function 
Nicaragua allowed allowed none; threat of freely transferable limits remain rental control remains; new 
loss of land if meaning? 
unused 
Peru allowed allowed if none; threat of freely transferable limits remain no restrictions land as an 
greater loss of land if economic 
than five unused good, nota 
hectares social good 
Mexico allowed, only for unused land individual property limits remain most restrictions remains; 
provided individual reverts to the transferable / ejidal removed on application 
no property; state land not freely ejidalland has changed 
minifundios not ejidal transferable 
land 
Honduras allowed allowed owner must transferable only to limits remain no restrictions if remains; 
work the land qualified not mortgaged application 
individuals until has changed 
paid for 
